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INTRODUCTION
The European Union is one of the world’s most important economic and political
institutions. As of 2014, the EU has a larger economy than the United States of America and has
more than 500 million citizens.1 European integration, the process of European nation-states
delegating their national sovereignty to create a united Europe, has been a long, and as of yet
unfinished, process driven by three generations of European intellectuals and statesmen. In place
of a single written constitution, the EU draws on the treaties completed between its memberstates as the foundation for its laws and institutions, starting with the 1951 Treaty Establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community.
France emerged after the Second World War as the leading Continental power in Western
Europe, and was a powerful actor throughout the process of European integration. It was the
French Government which proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first
step towards the contemporary European Union. France set the pace for European integration
over several decades, first by encouraging supranational integration in the 1950s, and then by
seeking to limit the delegation of state sovereignty to the supranational institutions in the 1960s
under the leadership of President Charles de Gaulle.
In the 1950s, many French intellectuals and statesmen played leading roles in the process
of European integration and the formation of the European Communities. Many of these French
1
"Eurostat - Total Population Table," Eurostat, last modified May 28, 2014,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnot
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public figures, such as Jean Monnet, were federalists and favored a supranational approach to
unifying Europe, in which European nations would partially delegate national sovereignty to
central institutions. This was a change from the international organizations of the time, which
were intergovernmental and based on co-operation between sovereign states. Additionally,
European integration required a rapprochement between the two most important Continental
nations: the former enemies France and Germany.
However, these French designs for European integration changed drastically after
General Charles de Gaulle assumed power in 1958. Official policy thereafter supported an
intergovernmental approach to European integration, with a vision of the six sovereign states of
the European Communities working together to determine common policies, but without
sacrificing national sovereignty to any central institutions. This ideological change brought the
General into conflict with the existing supranational Communities. After the sudden departure of
General de Gaulle in 1969, French policy once again returned to favoring supranationalism and
working for deeper supranational integration between the member-states.

es=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (accessed July 29, 2014); "Field Listing: GDP (Official Exchange Rate)," World
Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (accessed August 4, 2014).
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PART 1
FRANCE, MONNET, AND THE CREATION OF THE COMMUNITY
CHAPTER 1
EARLY FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR EUROPEAN UNITY

In the words of Professor Walter Hallstein, first President of the Commission of the
European Economic Community, “the present drive towards European unity draws its strength in
equal measure from two sources: a romantic vision, and hard-headed commonsense.”2 The
“romantic vision” was put forth by many French and European intellectuals before and during
the Second World War, but the “hard-headed commonsense” came from the conditions in
Europe after the war, and the adjustment to the new Cold War reality.

Prewar French Proposals for European Unity
The desire for European unity can be traced as far back as Roman times when most of the
continent was ruled by the same régime, and also to the attempted recreation of this by the socalled Holy Roman Empire, which in theory sought to unite all of Western Christendom.
Although affection for these two institutions by modern intellectuals is probably misguided,
these visions of a united Europe greatly influenced European thinkers. Professor Hallstein said
the whole movement for European unity can be traced back to “the influence of the Classical
world, and especially of Roman law, and its later amalgamation with Germanic elements; the
2

Walter Hallstein, Europe in the Making, trans. Charles Roetter (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,

1972), 43.

3

imprint of Christianity, and the unity achieved under the medieval [Holy Roman] Empire and the
Papacy, and the Reformation; the sense of solidarity embodied in the Crusades; the feeling of
nostalgia, often misguided, for medieval unity; the Kantian longing for perpetual peace.”3 This
nostalgic view of the past, even if admittedly flawed, drew European nations together as the
cultural and political inheritors of Western Civilization, particularly since many of the leading
politicians in postwar Europe belonged to Christian-democratic political parties. These Christiandemocrats drew on attempts to unite Christendom, but they believed that a united Europe in the
modern world must be a democratic institution. European unity could not be achieved by a
conquering power, as the efforts of figures such as Napoleon and especially Hitler proved.
Many leading French intellectuals proposed plans to unite Europe over the previous
centuries. The idea of a Christian European Republic dates back at least as far as Maximilian de
Béthune, Duc de Sully, a French government minister who served under King Henry IV. In the
17th century he proposed that all the kingdoms, principalities, and republics in Europe be merged
into one joint government encompassing all of Western Christendom.4 In 1712, the Abbé
Charles-Irénée Castel de St.-Pierre expressed a similar desire in his work Projet pour rendre la
paix perpétuelle en Europe, in which he advocates for a European Senate and Army.5
In the 19th and early 20th centuries there were several modern French proposals for
European unity. In the revolutionary year of 1848, Alphonse de Lamartine, a poet, Foreign
3
Walter Hallstein, "Britain and the European Community, Present, Past, and Future," speech presented at
National Association of British Manufacturers, London, May 24, 1963, Archive of European Integration,
http://aei.pitt.edu/14298/ (accessed July 29, 2014)
4

Maximilian de Béthune, Sully's Grand Design of Henry IV, from the Memoirs of Maximilian de Béthune,
duc de Sully, Grotius Society Publications (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921), 42,
https://archive.org/stream/sullysgranddesig00sullrich#page/n3/mode/2up (accessed July 29, 2014)
5
Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe (n.p., 1712),
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k105087z/f3.image (accessed July 29, 2014).
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Minister of France, and the man who declared the Second Republic at the Hôtel de Ville in Paris,
published his “Manifesto to Europe” which promotes the French Republic as the model
government for Europe, and mankind as a whole.6 In his poem “Marseillaise of Peace,” de
Lamartine includes lines such as “truth is my country” and “in the course of enlightenment, the
world rises to unity.”7 These lines are signs of the growing solidarity among western nations in
the post-Enlightenment era. The great French literary figure Victor Hugo, in his “Inaugural
Address as President of the International Peace Conference” in 1849, describes his own view of a
united Europe, “a day will come when bullets and bombshells will be replaced by votes, by the
universal suffrage of nations, by the venerable arbitration of a great Sovereign Senate, which will
be to Europe what the Parliament is to England, what the Diet is to Germany, what the
Legislative Assembly is to France.”8 This vision of a united and democratic Europe as a means
to preserve peace on the continent was far ahead of its time.
The final French proposal for European unity before the Second World War came from
Foreign Minister Aristide Briand. He advocated for a federal Europe in a speech before the
European delegations to the League of Nations in 1929. In the subsequent memorandum
published in 1930, he elaborates on this proposal, suggesting a “federation founded on the
principle of union, and not on unity,” led by an “executive organ in the form of a permanent
6
Alphonse de Lamartine, "Manifesto to Europe," speech, March 7, 1848, in Orations from Homer to
McKinley, comp. Mayo W. Hazeltine (New York: P. F. Collier, 1902), 7:4928,
http://www.unz.org/Pub/HazeltineMayo-1902v12-04922 (accessed July 31, 2014).
7

Buruma, Year Zero: 1945 and the Aftermath, 312.
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Victor Hugo, "Inaugural Address as President of the Congress," speech presented at Second General
Peace Congress, Paris, August 21, 1849, in Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Peace Conference
Held in Paris, comp. The Peace Congress Committee (London: Charles Gilpin, 1849), 10,
http://archive.org/stream/reportproceedin02goog#page/n5/mode/2up (accessed July 29, 2014).
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political committee.”9 Briand’s proposal for uniting Europe is based on the experiences of the
European nations in the previous war, and he hoped this proposal would end the rivalries
between the Continental powers. But it was those who needed to re-create Europe after the
Second World War who made real progress towards European unity.

French Resistance Movements and the Dream of European Unity
The Second World War tore Europe apart and threatened the very values upon which
Western Civilization is based. During this great upheaval, nationalist and fascist forces came to
power across the Continent, often by overthrowing democratic governments. In the east, the
Communist behemoth of the Soviet Union sought to expand into the Continent, and encouraged
the Communist parties in Europe to undermine their democratic governments. The nationalist
movements in Western Europe alienated the social-democratic and Christian-democratic
elements of society, and members of these groups were often exiled, jailed, or killed. These
persecuted groups saw the rise of nationalism as the cause of the war, and they sought a future
without national rivalries that would allow peace on the Continent. These persecuted political
groups saw European unity as a way to end violent nationalism.
After the Fall of France in 1940, General de Gaulle’s Free French armed forces continued
the war overseas, and the General along with many members of his provisional government,
including Jean Monnet, would be later involved in the process of European integration. In France
itself, there were several resistance organizations that included among their members many
intellectuals and politicians who later supported European unity, such as Robert Schuman who
9

Memorandum by French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Memorandum sur l'organisation d'un régime
d'union fédérale européenne," May 1, 1930, World Digital Library, United States Library of Congress, Washington,
DC, http://dl.wdl.org/11583/service/11583.pdf (accessed July 29, 2014).
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was Prime Minister and later Foreign Minister of France during the first stages of European
integration.
One such French resistance organization was the Mouvement de libération nationale, also
known as ‘Combat’. The leading figures of this organization included the writer Albert Camus,
and Georges Bidault, the future Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of France. In 1942, Combat
published a manifesto which describes the group’s hope for a united Europe, “the United States
of Europe – a stage on the road to union – will soon be a living reality for which we are
fighting.”10 These Frenchmen witnessed the terror of unbridled nationalism in the brutality of the
Vichy régime, which was led by Marshall Philippe Pétain and supported by many members of
the French political right. This resistance group also published a newspaper of the same name,
Combat, to which many leading French writers and intellectuals contributed, including Albert
Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Raymond Aron. In one article, Combat declares, “the European
resistance will remake Europe… A Europe politically and economically united because we have
paid the full price of division.”11 These themes were present in several other Continental
resistance movements.
In Italy, a group of left-wing resisters imprisoned by the Fascists on Ventotene Island
wrote a manifesto in 1941, in which they expressed their support for uniting Europe to halt the
dangerous nationalism on the Continent. Their ideas are very similar to those of the French
resistance movements. The Ventotene Manifesto states, “the question which must first be
resolved, and if it is not then any other progress made up to that point is mere appearance, is that
10

Buruma, Year Zero: 1945 and the Aftermath, 310.

11

Altiero Spinelli, "European Union and the Resistance," in The New Politics of European Integration, ed.
Ghita Ionescu (London: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 8.
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of the abolition of the division of Europe into national, sovereign states.”12 The traditional
system of European nation-states was clearly seen by the resistance movements as the cause of
the war. Altiero Spinelli, one of the authors of the Ventotene Manifesto, describes this lack of
faith in the nation-state, “the Nation State had become, for those who sought guidance, a
compass which had ceased to give any bearings.”13 The Europe which emerged after the Second
World War needed to look past these national divisions to which Europeans were accustomed.
In the first half of 1944, representatives from the Continental resistance movements
including those of France, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia met several times in Geneva. In July, 1944, they issued a “Draft Declaration of
the European Resistance Movements” which expressed the desire for peace and the
establishment of a ‘Federal Union’. The Declaration states, “European peace is the keystone in
the arch of world peace. During the life time of one generation Europe has been twice the center
of a world conflict whose chief cause was the existence of thirty sovereign States in Europe. It is
a most urgent task to end this international anarchy by creating a European Federal Union.”14
The Federal Union which they proposed included a government which would represent the
people, not the national governments, an army separate from the national armies, and a European
court.15
12
Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, "The Ventotene Manifesto," 1941, Le Centre Virtuel de la
Connaissance sur l’Europe, Le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, http://www.cvce.eu/obj
/the_manifesto_of_ventotene_1941-en-316aa96c-e7ff-4b9e-b43a-958e96afbecc.html (accessed July 29, 2014).
13

Spinelli, "European Union and the Resistance," in The New Politics of European, 2.

14

European Resistance Movements, "Draft Declaration of the European Resistance Movements," May 20,
1944, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/draft_declaration_of_the_european_resistance_movements_20_may_1944-end68ca0ad-c24b-4906-8235-96b82814133a.html (accessed July 29, 2014).
15

Ibid.

8

After the Liberation of France, members of the French resistance movements established
the French Committee for European Federation and announced that the first European Federalist
Conference would take place in Paris on March 25, 1945. Those in attendance included Albert
Camus, Altiero Spinelli, and George Orwell.16 As a result of the Paris Conference, and the
previous conference in Geneva, the Union des fédéralistes Européenne was formed in Paris,
France, in December, 1946. During the following decades, this organization advocated for a
united federal Europe.
The Second World War, the second war to devastate the continent of Europe in a
generation, clearly demonstrated that the old nation-state system in Europe needed reform to
prevent national rivalries which would lead to future wars. Many of the intellectuals among the
socialist and the Christian-democratic resistance organizations in France, and other Continental
countries, realized the days of the nation-state were near an end, and went on to become very
influential in the movement for European unity after the war.

Jean Monnet, the Father of Europe
Jean Monnet was born in Cognac, France, and spent several years travelling the world as
a salesman for his father’s company which sold Cognac brandy. On one such trip to Canada he
attempted to reserve a berth on the Titanic, and were he successful, Europe would be very
different than it is today. 17 He went on to be a French statesman, although he was never elected
to a political office. Monnet, because of a medical condition, was one of the few Frenchmen of
his generation who did not fight in the First World War. During the war Monnet conferred with
Prime Minister René Viviani on the need for the Allies to better co-ordinate shipping with the
16

Spinelli, "European Union and the Resistance," in The New Politics of European, 8.

17

François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York: Norton, 1994), 31.

9

British to prepare for a long conflict. Monnet was then sent to London to co-ordinate supplies
between the two nations.
After the war, Monnet attended the Paris Peace Conference and proposed that economic
co-ordination between the Allies should continue as it had during the war. But, he was
unsuccessful. Monnet was chosen as the first Deputy Secretary-General of the League of
Nations, but became disillusioned with this organization and resigned after only a few years. He
described it as nothing more than a “telephone exchange” which proposed “little solutions for big
problems.”18 In the interwar years he was a consultant to foreign governments in Europe and
Asia supervising economic and monetary projects.
After the outbreak of the Second World War, Prime Minister Édouard Daladier sent
Monnet to London to help co-ordinate the Allied weapons industries. He became chairman of the
Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee, and chose the French economist Robert Marjolin as the
Committee’s Secretary. He was later involved, along with General de Gaulle and future Prime
Minister René Pleven, in the last minute attempt to unite France and the United Kingdom to
prevent a French surrender. After the Fall of France in 1940, the British Government sent
Monnet to the United States to help manage allied arms production, and then in 1943 he joined
General de Gaulle in Algiers. He served as a member of the French Committee of National
Liberation in Algiers, which acted as the French provisional government. Monnet was among the
seven original members of the Committee along with de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud.
Monnet did not always see eye-to-eye with General de Gaulle, and Monnet worked to ensure the
functioning of the Committee in hope of preventing either de Gaulle or Giraud from returning to
France as a dictator after the Liberation. He was successful in this respect, as de Gaulle later
18

Ibid, 42.
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admits, “the Inspirer [Monnet] came up with a scheme to confound General Giraud and General
de Gaulle in a single government.”19 By encouraging the Committee to function properly and
democratically, he helped to ensure the return of the Republic after the war.
It was in Algiers that Monnet began planning for postwar Europe. Monnet, de Gaulle,
and other leading Frenchmen such as René Mayer, Hervé Alphand, Robert Marjolin, and Étienne
Hirsch, discussed plans to reconstruct the Continent, although each had differing proposals.
Monnet desired “a single economic entity with free trade.”20 Additionally, in a memorandum
prepared for the Committee, he writes, “there will be no peace in Europe if states re-establish
themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with all this implies by way of economic
protectionism” and “the states of Europe must form a federation or a ‘European entity’ which
will make them a single economic unit.”21 These are preludes to his proposals for the European
Communities after the war. De Gaulle was skeptical of these grand European ideas, declaring,
“after a war such as this, it is hard to see French and Germans belonging together in an economic
union.”22 De Gaulle and Monnet held differing views on European unity for the rest of their
lives.
After the war, Monnet secured loans from the United States for the French Government,
and de Gaulle appointed him as Commissioner-General of the French Economic Modernization
and Investment Plan, a role directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. Monnet once again called
on Robert Marjolin who became Deputy Commissioner of the Plan. Marjolin was with Monnet
in London and Algiers during the war, and agreed with Monnet that Europe should be
19

Ibid, 125.

20

Ibid, 126.
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Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), 222.

22

Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First, 126.
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economically united. Marjolin writes in 1944, “the European economy as a whole would receive
an extraordinary impetus from the unification of the European market.”23 The modernization
plan involved reforming the French economy and building up industry, especially the steel
industry. Although France had large iron ore deposits in Lorraine, the Modernization Plan relied
on importing coal from occupied Germany in order to support the industrial expansion of France.
Monnet strongly advocated for the creation of a European federation, but unlike many
intellectuals of the time, he worked to achieve it incrementally. On this subject he writes,
“Europe will not be built all at once, or as a single whole: it will be built by concrete
achievements which first create de facto solidarity.”24 The idea of nation-states suddenly
surrendering all of their sovereignty to a European government, as was hoped for by members of
the resistance movements during the war, seemed remote in the postwar world. But, it was
plausible that nations would delegate their sovereignty gradually to create a federation as the
ultimate goal.
Compared to other federalists, Monnet placed more emphasis on economic integration.
Coming from an economics background, he saw how intertwined economics and politics were,
and also how important economics was during a war. He believed that economic integration
would reduce the possibility of a future war by making the European nations interdependent. As
the leader of the French Economic Modernization Plan, he oversaw a period of nationalization of
industry and the centralization of the French economy. He likewise wished to centralize and
merge the individual national economies in Europe to form one large more economically
competitive market.
23

Robert Marjolin, Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911-1986 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,

1989), 128.
24

Monnet, Memoirs, 300.
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Monnet’s vision for European integration was a strongly supranational one. He believed
that delegating a portion of national sovereignty to central institutions was the only effective way
to achieve European unity. He saw during his time at the League of Nations how
intergovernmental organizations were ineffective because the governments could never
unanimously agree on anything, and since each nation was sovereign, the League’s agreements
could only be carried out if all members approved. Monnet therefore believed that European
integration should be based on supranational institutions to which European nations would
delegate part of their national sovereignty.

Postwar Europe
After the war in Europe ended in May, 1945, the Continent was in ruins. There was
widespread destruction among both the defeated nations and the victors. The Continental and
world economies were in shambles. Much animosity remained between the victors and the
vanquished, and war crimes trials would continue for years seeking some sort of justice for the
crimes committed by Europeans against fellow Europeans. Soon new tensions began to appear
between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, particularly the United States, leaving Europe
trapped in the middle.
Overall, Europe’s political and economic power was on the decline. Economically and
militarily the United States and the USSR were now the most powerful nations in the world.
Europe was caught between these two superpowers in a world which soon grew more and more
polarized. Even General de Gaulle, the defiant leader of the Free French armed forces and the
proud defender of la gloire de la France, admitted that the international situation was
dramatically changed, and not in France – or Europe’s – favor. Europe was irrevocably altered,
and needed to find a new place in the postwar world. Looking back on France’s situation after
13

the war, the General says, “doubtless, France no longer appears to be the gigantic nation that she
was in the times of Louis XIV or of Napoleon I. Doubtless also, the brutal collapse of 1940 –
although it was preceded, during the First World War, by an admirable deployment of the
capacities and merits of our country, although it was followed, during the Second, by the impetus
of the Résistance… this collapse left, in many minds, the imprint of doubt, if not despair.”25
Large political changes were needed to secure a brighter future for France and for Europe as a
whole.
In addition to the doubts about the political situation expressed by politicians after the
war and by the resistance movements during the war, doubts about the economic situation also
remained. Monnet, leader of the French postwar Economic Modernization Plan, describes the
economic situation in postwar Europe, “in 1913, Western Europe, to the west of the Oder,
produced 45% of the world’s manufactures; by 1937 this share had dropped to 34%; in 1951 it
was no more than 26%. While world production trebled between 1913 and 1951, that of Western
Europe grew only to less than twice its volume.”26 As these figures show, European production
compared to that of the world as a whole declined by 1937, before the Second World War even
began. Although Europe needed to rebuild its economy after the destruction of the Second World
War, it could not be rebuilt in the same way and be successful, much like its political system.
Europe needed to modernize its industries to compete in the modern age, just as Europe needed
to modernize its political system to maintain peace in the new postwar world.
25

Charles de Gaulle, "Twelfth Press Conference Held by General de Gaulle as President of the Fifth
Republic," speech presented at Élysée Palace, Paris, September 9, 1965, Archive of European Integration,
http://aei.pitt.edu/5356/ (accessed July 29, 2014).
26

Jean Monnet, "Lecture to Society of Political Economy," speech presented at Society of Political
Economy, Brussels, June 30, 1953, Archive of European Integration, http://aei.pitt.edu/14365 (accessed July 29,
2014).
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The Second World War is sometimes described as a ‘European Civil War’ by proponents
of European integration, and in the years after the war much thought was given to how future
Continental wars could be avoided. Cyril Connolly, an Englishman who managed the popular
literary journal Horizon during the war, says it best when he writes in December, 1944, “every
European war is a war lost by Europe.”27 Political and economic integration was seen by many
leading Frenchmen as the best way to prevent future wars and to empower a continent which
was, in the words of Monnet, “divided politically, weakened by the war and the fear of wars.”28
The previous system of treaties and alliances between European nations failed catastrophically,
as the Second World War demonstrated. Monnet believed that European integration and the
creation of common European institutions could solve these problems. In a speech entitled “To
Make Europe is to Make Peace,” which he presented at Aix-la-Chapelle, Monnet says, “peace
does not depend on treaties and agreements. It depends essentially on the creation of conditions
which, though they may not change the nature of men, will direct their conduct towards each
other into peaceful channels.”29 It was this belief that led Monnet to become the champion of a
supranational united Europe.

Early Postwar Attempts at Unifying Europe
In 1948, 800 delegates from Western European nations attended the Congress of Europe
at The Hague. This conference was led by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
included many delegates who later became key figures in the process of European integration,
27

Buruma, Year Zero: 1945 and the Aftermath, 254.
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Jean Monnet, "Speech to the Common Assembly," speech presented at Common Assembly of the
European Coal and Steel Community, Maison de l’Europe, Strasbourg, January 12, 1953, Archive of European
Integration, http://aei.pitt.edu/14364/ (accessed July 29, 2014).
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including: Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom, Paul van Zeeland of
Belgium, Walter Hallstein and Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, and François Mitterrand of
France, who was a minister in the French Government under Prime Minister Robert Schuman. At
the end of the Congress, a resolution was passed stating that the Congress recognized “the urgent
duty of the nations of Europe to create an economic and political union in order to assure
security and social progress” and that “the time has come when the European nations must
transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and
economic action.”30 The Congress led to the establishment of the Council of Europe by the
Treaty of London in 1949, but this resultant organization was far from the lofty goals which were
proposed at the Congress. The Council of Europe was merely another intergovernmental and
inter-parliamentary organization that had no real power and entailed no delegation of national
sovereignty to a common institution as the resolution proposed. Nonetheless, France’s
commitment to the Council was strong and many leading Frenchmen served in the Council’s
Parliamentary Assembly, including René Coty, Georges Bidault, Paul Reynaud, and Guy Mollet.
This institution was a place where proposals for future unification could be discussed by the
leading politicians of the day.
Meanwhile, an economic organization of similar structure was established to distribute
American economic aid to the struggling Continent. In a speech in June, 1947, American
Secretary of State George Marshall proposed an extensive economic aid plan to Europe. In his
speech he describes how the aid plan was conceived, “in considering the requirements for the
rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories,
30
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mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months
that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of
the European economy.”31 The United States desired an economically strong Europe to help reestablish international trade and contribute towards the stability of the global economy. This was
in line with the Truman Doctrine, which President Harry S. Truman previously announced on
March 12, 1947. In this speech the President said that the United States “must take immediate
and resolute action” to ensure the “economic stability and orderly political processes” in Western
Europe.32 The United States hoped the Marshall Plan would encourage greater unity in Europe,
and required the nations of Europe to set up a European organization to administer this economic
aid to the Continent.
The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was created to meet this
requirement. The OEEC had a secretariat based in Paris, and was led by the Frenchman Robert
Marjolin. It was the first real economic co-operation organization in Europe, but its
intergovernmental structure meant it would never be able to lead to the federation that Monnet
and others desired. The French Government wanted the OEEC to have a supranational
dimension, and wanted the Secretary-General to have the power to make decisions. But, the
British wanted an intergovernmental organization in which the Secretary-General merely carried
out the decisions of the national governments, and it was this view that carried the day. Monnet
expresses his opinion on the OEEC in a letter to Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, “the idea that
sixteen sovereign nations will co-operate effectively is an illusion. I believe that only the
31
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establishment of a federation of the west, including Great Britain, will enable us to solve our
problems quickly enough, and finally prevent war.”33 The OEEC was a step forward in European
economic co-operation, but it was not supranational and so it could never be the organization
which led to a federal Europe.
Marjolin, although understanding the limits of the OEEC, recognized the important role it
was to play. He writes that the organization afforded “a dialogue between the great powers so as
to ensure continuing peace and erase rapidly the scars left behind by the war and the great
Depression.”34 He later said at a press conference in 1949, “we all want Europe to become
unified, but we have to face facts: the essential responsibility for Europe’s salvation still rests
with the national governments.”35 This economic co-operation between European governments
was very successful. Although each nation was in charge of its own economic recovery, Marjolin
advocated that they follow the French Economic Modernization Plan, which he helped to design
and implement, as an example. The Plan encouraged long-term investments to promote industry
and rebuild infrastructure. Between 1948 and 1949 industrial output of the OEEC nations grew
9%, and between 1949 and 1950 it grew another 6%. Agriculture grew more than 9% during the
period from 1948 to 1950. In total, by 1950 Europe’s industrial output was 25% above its 1938
level, with French industrial production 23% over its 1938 level.36 European recovery showed
signs of success, although it was funded by American dollars.
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The Cold War and Franco-German Rapprochement
During the spring of 1948, the nations of Western Europe realized that the possibility of a
resurgent Germany was no longer the greatest threat to Continental security but instead the
greatest threat was the expansionist Soviet Union. The Prague Putsch of February, 1948, and the
subsequent ascension of a Communist as President of Czechoslovakia on June 7, 1948, showed
the Western European nations that the Soviet Union had ambitions to expand its power bloc and
spread Communism to new nations. That spring was also the last meeting of the Allied Control
Council, the organ established by the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France
to govern occupied Germany, on March 20, 1948. All decisions of the Control Council were
taken unanimously, but the Western Allies and the Soviets were unable to reach any meaningful
agreements. Ten days later, on March 30, 1948, the Soviets demanded the right to search all
Allied troop trains headed to West Berlin. By the end of June, all land and water routes to West
Berlin were closed, which led to the Berlin Airlift on the part of the Western Allies to re-supply
their garrisons and the citizens of the western part of the city.
These new Cold War tensions reinforced Europe’s subordinate position between the two
superpowers. Professor Hallstein writes on the effect the Cold War had on the movement to unite
Europe, “the strongest spur to action, to building a united Europe, was a clear political need; to
bring to an end the demoralizing situation in which Europe was at the mercy of political
decisions taken by others outside Europe.”37 Only a united Europe could be in a position to play
a meaningful role on the international political scene.
The threat from the east led the western powers to work to restore and rebuild Germany.
Soon after the war in Europe ended in the spring of 1945, the French and Germans began to set
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aside their differences. The aftermath of the First World War, and the outbreak of the Second
World War, showed that old conflicts needed to be laid to rest in order to prevent the repeat of
past disasters. In August, 1945, at the German city of Saarbrücken near the French border,
General de Gaulle, leader of the Free French during the Second World War, proclaimed in a
speech, “Frenchmen and Germans must let bygones be bygones, must work together, and must
remember that they are Europeans.”38 Additionally, Robert Marjolin who was with de Gaulle in
Algiers, and prior to that in London with Monnet, writes of his feelings after the war, “despite
the violence of my feelings towards the Germans before and during the war, I had rapidly
convinced myself after the hostilities ended that Europe could not recover unless Germany were
rebuilt and became once again a great industrial country.”39 This attitude of reconciliation
towards Germany was in sharp contrast to French attempts to punish Germany after the First
World War.
Fortunately, there were public figures in Germany who welcomed these words and had
similar desires for reconciliation. Konrad Adenauer, the future Federal Chancellor of West
Germany and a strong proponent of a united Europe, writes in a letter from October, 1945, “the
part of Germany not occupied by Russia is an integral part of Western Europe… It is in the
interests not only of that part of Germany but also of Britain and France to unite Europe under
their leadership.”40 These national leaders realized that a new Europe needed to be built, one in
which national rivalries no longer remained.
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In response to the new Cold War reality, Foreign Minister Georges Bidault announced
during a speech to the National Assembly on June 11, 1948, “we must build up Europe, and we
must find some place in it for Germany. We will do all we can to create a unified Europe, for this
is the only way we can reconcile the countries of Europe.”41 Within a year, Germany – at least
the western part – was once again a political entity, although not all postwar restrictions imposed
by the occupying powers were removed. There were still fears among the French political
establishment that an entirely independent Germany would turn down the path of re-armament
and once again menace France across the Rhine. It was because of this fear that the German
question was very contentious and of such high importance to the French Government. At this
time, Monnet writes, “the German situation is rapidly turning into a cancer that will be
dangerous to our peace in the near future, and immediately to France, unless its development is
directed towards hope for the Germans and collaboration with free peoples.”42 It was this
realization that Germany needed to be linked to the free nations of the Western Europe that led to
the creation of a new democratic German government.
On May 23, 1949, the Federal Republic of (West) Germany was instituted to govern the
former British, French, and American occupation zones, although it was still under the
jurisdiction of the Allied Commissioners until 1955. The newly created West Germany wanted to
be accepted back into the community of nations following the period of occupation, and sought
to improve relations with the other Western European nations, particularly France which was the
most powerful nation in western continental Europe and the longtime enemy of Germany. This
new German state immediately expressed its support for European integration. The preamble to
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the West German constitution, the Basic Law, states, “conscious of their responsibility before
God and Men, animated by the resolve to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united
Europe, the German people have adopted… this Basic Law.”43 The German desire to participate
in a united Europe was thus evident to all, but there was much debate among Western European
nations whether or not the Germans should be allowed to be an equal partner as they desired.
The first Federal Chancellor of West Germany was Konrad Adenauer, the Christiandemocrat from Cologne. His name was number one atop the list the Allies drew up containing
the names of ‘politically acceptable’ Germans during the war, and in the postwar years he rose to
power as the leader of the Christian Democratic Union party. As a Christian-democrat,
Adenauer’s government was ideologically similar to many of the parties involved in the
coalitions which governed France.
In March, 1950, Adenauer went a step further and proposed that France and Germany be
politically and economically united. He proposed this in a series of interviews with the American
journalist Joseph Kingsbury-Smith of the International News Service. In the first interview,
Adenauer said, “a union between France and Germany would give new life and vigor to a
Europe that is seriously ill” and that “it would cause the rivalry between the two countries to
disappear.”44 He also points out the implications of even just an economic union between the
nations, by comparing it to the 1834 Zollverein customs union between the many German states,
which was the first step towards the unification of Germany.45
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The French Government was not initially receptive to this proposal, with the German
attempt to control the Continent during the war ever-present in their minds. But General de
Gaulle, who was not in government, gave his opinion of this proposal on March 16, 1950. The
General said, “I see no reason, in fact, that if the German people and the French people overcome
their mutual grievances and external intrigues, that they could not come together” and that the
plan was “a possibility of common development which could transform free Europe, and also
restore hope which has been lost. In total it would regain, on modern bases, that is to say
economic, social, strategic, and cultural, the enterprise of Charlemagne.”46 Although not
officially endorsed by the French Government, Adenauer’s proposal helped to re-assure the
French that Germany’s leaders supported a united and peaceful Europe. It was upon this FrancoGerman rapprochement that a united Europe was built.
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Chapter 2
FRANCE AND THE COMMUNITY OF SIX:
THE SCHUMAN DECLARATION TO THE TREATIES OF ROME

The process of constructing a united Europe began during the 1950s with the creation of
the three European Communities: the Coal and Steel Community, the Atomic Energy
Community, and the Economic Community. The member-states of these Communities were
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. These member-states,
known as The Six, delegated their sovereignty over certain policy areas to the Communities’
institutions, therefore making the Communities supranational in nature, as Monnet desired. It
was Monnet himself who proposed the first Community, the Coal and Steel Community. The
Communities partially integrated the member-states, and the institutions which governed the
Community remain in the governing structure of the contemporary European Union.

The Schuman Declaration, 1950
Robert Schuman was Prime Minister of France from November, 1947, to July, 1948, and
then again for a week during September, 1948. He was a member of the National Assembly from
the French border region of Alsace-Lorraine, but was born in neighboring Luxembourg. He did
not become a French citizen until 1919, after the region of Alsace-Lorraine was returned to
France by the Treaty of Versailles. Schuman was a member of Paul Reynaud’s government in
the spring of 1940 when Germany invaded France. After the Fall of France, Schuman was jailed
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by the Nazis and later served in the resistance in the unoccupied zone. He was a strong supporter
of Franco-German reconciliation and of European integration, and advocated for both as Foreign
Minister of France from July, 1948, until January, 1953.
Schuman worked hard after the war to reach an understanding between France and
Germany. As someone from the border region between the two nations, he was seen as being the
perfect man for the task. He told the National Assembly in 1949, “if I find myself occupying this
position [of Foreign Minister], it is not because I have sought it but doubtless because someone
from France’s eastern frontier was needed to try and achieve peaceful co-existence between the
two countries.”47 Schuman agreed with Monnet, Bidault, and others that Germany must be
welcomed back into the community of free nations on a fairly equal footing with the other
nations of Europe.
The German question was the dominant issue facing the Allies in the late 1940s and early
1950s. At the Allied foreign ministers meeting in September, 1949, American Secretary of State
Dean Acheson asked Schuman to submit a proposal to resolve the German question at their next
meeting in May, 1950. Schuman did not have any concrete proposals in mind, and conferred
with Monnet and others on this important issue. In January, 1950, Monnet wrote a letter to
Schuman in which he outlines the importance of reconciliation and equality with Germany in
order to reach a permanent solution, “peace can be founded only on equality, we failed in 1919
because we introduced discrimination and a sense of superiority, now we are beginning to make
the same mistake again.”48 The French Government followed this policy of bringing about
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greater equality between France and the occupied Germans, at least to a degree that prevented a
resurgent Germany.
In April, 1950, Monnet, along with Paul Reuter, the legal advisor to the French Foreign
Ministry, and Étienne Hirsch, a longtime associate of Monnet who later became President of the
Euratom Commission, wrote a memorandum to Schuman, the French Foreign Minister at the
time.49 The memorandum proposed that the French and German coal and steel industries should
be merged and subjected to a supranational ‘High Authority’ under which both nations were to
be treated as equals. A similar proposal was made several years before by Paul Reynaud to the
intergovernmental Council of Europe but that proposal went nowhere, which reinforced the view
among federalists that the Council of Europe was not the organization upon which a European
federation could be built.50
Monnet’s proposal to Schuman made both political as well as economic sense for France
and Europe. Politically it would remove the industrial restrictions on Germany, and resolve the
issue of controlling the industrial potential of the Saar and Ruhr. Also, France and Germany were
treated equally under the plan, something the Germans greatly desired. Additionally, with the
heavy industries of the two nations intertwined, the risk of future wars diminished greatly.
Finally, the supranational institutions proposed in the memorandum were the first step towards
an eventual European federation.
Economically, France had the most to gain from this initiative. It was feared that if
Germany regained control over its coal resources in the Saar and Ruhr these resources would be
directed primarily to German industry. Since there was only a finite amount of coal, less would
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be transported to France which relied on German coal to power its own domestic industry. If the
flow of coal to France stopped or diminished, it would greatly jeopardize Monnet’s Economic
Modernization Plan, which was so far very successful in rebuilding French industry. The
proposed pooling of resources, however, would ensure that both French and German industries
were treated equally, and so maintain the flow of coal to French industry.
Monnet’s proposal was delivered to Schuman by his directeur de cabinet, Bernard
Clappier, just before Schuman’s train left the Gare de l’Est headed for Metz, where he spent the
weekend. Upon his return to Paris the following Monday, Schuman told Monnet that he agreed
with the proposal, and the two Frenchmen drafted what became the Schuman Declaration.
Although Monnet initiated this proposal, Schuman was essential for bringing about the political
will for its implementation. Monnet also sent his proposal to Prime Minister Georges Bidault, but
never received a response. Schuman, however, devoted himself entirely to the plan’s
implementation. Monnet writes about the great step Schuman took by endorsing this plan, “the
fact is there was no Bidault Plan, but a Schuman Plan.”51 Without Schuman’s support, Monnet’s
proposal had no chance of success.
Before the plan was publicly announced, the French Government needed to ensure that
the German Government was in agreement. On May 8, 1950, Schuman sent a messenger to
Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn with the Declaration and a personal letter explaining the proposals.
In the letter, Schuman referenced Adenauer’s previous comments to the journalist KingsburySmith in which Adenauer advocated for a Franco-German union. Adenauer was immediately
receptive to the proposal and understood it had far-reaching economic and political implications.
Adenauer recalls this day in his memoirs, writing that he “informed Robert Schuman at once that
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I accepted his proposal wholeheartedly.”52 Adenauer later told Monnet, “I regard the
implementation of the French proposal as my most important task. If I succeed, I believe that my
life will not have been wasted.”53 Although this project was an economic proposal, its real
significance was that it was the first step towards a united Europe. Adenauer later said in a
speech to the West German Bundestag, “the importance of this project is above all political and
not economic.”54 The Chancellor recognized that what Monnet and Schuman proposed was not
just industrial co-operation, but rather the first step on the path to supranational European
integration with the hope of an eventual European federation.
Schuman held a press conference the next day, May 9, 1950, in the famed Salon de
l’Horloge in the French Foreign Ministry at the Quai d’Orsay. This room, decorated in the
elaborate Second Empire style, was where the Paris Peace Conference convened in 1919.
Schuman delivered the Declaration to a gathered audience of the international press with Monnet
at his side. Schuman proposed “that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be
placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the
participation of the other countries of Europe.”55 The Declaration continues, “Europe will not be
made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements
which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the
elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first
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place be between these two countries.”56 Finally, Schuman said that due to the proposed pooling
of coal and steel, “any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but
materially impossible.”57 Although the Schuman Plan facilitated Franco-German reconciliation,
it also laid the foundation for a future European federation, and thus Monnet hoped that many
other European nations would join the forthcoming organization. This encouraged those who
feared a resurgent Germany to support the Schuman Plan as a means to establish peace and
stability on the Continent.
After the Declaration was announced, Schuman attended a conference of the three Allied
foreign ministers in London from May 11 to May 13. The role of West Germany in the face of
the Soviet threat to Western Europe was the main topic of this conference, but the discussion
went quite differently than expected in light of the Schuman Declaration. Charles Ronsac, a
French journalist at the conference, writes, “the atmosphere, the orientation, the perspective have
all changed. In place of a negative Cold War conference, we are going to have a positive
conference, an attempt to economically organize Europe.”58 The Schuman Declaration changed
the way that European leaders looked at the postwar problems of Europe, and proposed the
creation of supranational institutions as a means to solve these problems.

The European Coal and Steel Community
In May, 1950, the Schuman Declaration announced the French Government’s intention to
establish a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a dream which was realized the
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following year. The ECSC Treaty was drafted by an intergovernmental conference in Paris
which commenced in June, 1950. Monnet played a leading role in the negotiations and
throughout the conference he continually expounded the idea that key principle of the ECSC
Treaty was the delegation of sovereign powers to a central European institution for the first time,
even though the institution controlled only one area of the economy. Monnet writes in a letter at
the time of the Treaty negotiations, “the Schuman Proposals are revolutionary or they are
nothing… The Schuman Proposals provide the basis for the building of a new Europe through
the concrete achievement of a supranational régime.”59 The resulting ECSC Treaty established a
supranational institution that was very much in line with what Monnet and Schuman first
proposed in May, 1950.
The 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed and
ratified by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. These nations
became known as ‘The Six’. The United Kingdom notably did not sign the Treaty; it was more
concerned with its Empire and its relationship to the United States, and was unwilling to delegate
its sovereignty to a Continental institution. Although Monnet desired British participation in a
united Europe, the proposals outlined in the Treaty were too important to allow Britain to water
them down. When asked in London by Sir Stafford Cripps whether the ECSC Treaty
negotiations would go on without British participation, Monnet replied, “we waited for you for a
decision when Hitler entered the Rhineland in 1936 and the results were disastrous. We shall not
make that same mistake again.”60 François Duchêne, a political writer and advisor to Monnet, as
well as his biographer, described the British outlook, writing that they were “living in Paradise
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Lost, rather one to be gained.”61 Britain’s belief that it was still an imperial power prevented it
from joining any supranational institutions. For the time being, a united Europe was built without
Britain.
The ECSC Treaty’s preamble states, “Europe can be built only by concrete actions
which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common bases for economic
development.”62 This was the only path that Monnet believed would lead to an eventual
federation. Article 4 of the Treaty banned customs duties and quotas on the import and export of
coal and steel among the member-states of the Community, which created the integrated
economy that Monnet and Marjolin desired. The governing structure of the ECSC was
supranational in nature, but also included intergovernmental elements. The ECSC was governed
by the supranational High Authority, the Court of Justice, the intergovernmental Council of
Ministers, and the Common Assembly made up of members of the national parliaments.
The most important and revolutionary aspect of the governing structure was the
supranational High Authority, which Monnet was chosen to lead as its first President. The High
Authority had nine total members, eight were chosen by collective decision of the national
governments, and the ninth was chosen by a decision of the initial eight members.63 The High
Authority was truly supranational in nature, since its members represented the Community, and
not the national governments. Its functioning is described in Article 9 of the ECSC Treaty, which
states, “the members of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in complete
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independence, in the general interest of the Community. In the fulfillment of their duties, they
shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government or from any organization. They
will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the supranational character of their functions.”64
The members of the High Authority swore an oath to respect their role as defined in the Treaty
upon taking office. The role of the member-states was also defined in the Treaty, “each member
State agrees to respect this supranational character and to make no effort to influence the
members of the High Authority in the execution of their duties.” 65 The High Authority was the
first European institution which partially exercised the delegated sovereignty of the memberstates and was independent of the national governments.
In addition to the High Authority, the other key governing body was the Council of
Ministers, where the national governments were represented. Its membership was made up of
either the industry or economy ministers from the national governments and had the power to
block the initiatives of the High Authority. Monnet’s plan originally did not include a Council of
Ministers, since it was intergovernmental and not supranational in nature. Professor Hallstein,
leader of the German delegation at the Treaty negotiations, “strongly agreed” with Monnet that
the entire organization should be supranational.66 This was because, in Monnet’s words, “the
supranational Authority is not merely the best means for solving economic problems: it is also
the first move towards a federation.”67 Any intergovernmental part of the institution was likely to
protect the power of the national governments and slow down progress towards a European
federation.
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However, not all the other negotiators agreed with Monnet and the federalists that the
organization should be entirely supranational, and the Council of Ministers was added to the
Treaty to appease these skeptical delegates. Dirk Spierenburg, the Dutch negotiator, along with
the representatives of Belgium and Luxembourg, argued for this inclusion of the Council of
Ministers. At the first meeting of the Council, Adenauer, whose nation held the revolving
presidency, described its role, “the Council stands at the crossroads of two kinds of sovereignty:
national and supranational.”68 The Council went on to be an important player in the process of
European integration and acted as a reassurance that the national governments still had a role in
making Community decisions. A modified version of the Council exists today in the present
governing structure of the European Union.
The lasting importance of the ECSC was twofold: it modernized and united, if only
partially, the European economy, and it laid the institutional foundation for future European
integration. Economically, it helped to rebuild European heavy industry that was destroyed by
the war. By 1953, the ECSC oversaw “resources to a value of 5 to 6 milliard [billion] dollars per
annum, representing 15% of [the member-states’] industrial output; industries which, by
employing more than 1,750,000 persons, provide work for one out of ten of their working
population; products which, up to an output of 300 million tons, represent more than 40% of the
total tonnage transported within the Community.”69 Likewise, the ECSC had a successful record
of growing the industries which it oversaw, and was particularly successful in increasing the
trade of coal and steel between The Six. According to Monnet, by 1953 the transport of coal
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between the member states increased 300 fold, amounting to roughly 400,000 tons a month and
the transport of iron ore from France to Belgium and Luxembourg increased 150 fold, amounting
to roughly 200,000 tons a month.70 This economic success continued, with steel production in
the Community nearly doubling between 1953 and 1961, and the Community overtook the
United States in total coal and steel production by 1962.71
Politically, it was the first time that European nations partially delegated their sovereignty
to a supranational institution. The ECSC proved that supranational institutions could function
correctly, and in the following years national politicians increasingly began to support the idea of
creating new supranational institutions instead of intergovernmental ones, an idea for which
Monnet long advocated. The French National Assembly ratified the ECSC Treaty on December
13, 1951, by a wide margin of 377 votes to 233.72
But not all national politicians approved of a united Europe based on supranational
institutions. General de Gaulle, founder of the influential political party Rassemblement du
Peuple Français (RPF), was highly critical of the ECSC and described its central institutions as a
“cabal”.73 But among those who advocated for further integration, the ECSC was a glowing
success. In a letter from April 18, 1951, the day the ECSC Treaty was signed, Schuman writes
that it was the dawning of “a new era in the relations between the participating countries and
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represents a decisive phase on the way to European unity.”74 Hallstein, the head of the German
delegation at the Treaty negotiations, writes that the ECSC’s essential characteristics were that it
was “supranational, that it was practical, and that it was partial.”75 Although the ECSC was
important, more progress was required to realize the eventual goal of a European federation.

The Proposed European Defense Community
Before the negotiations on the ECSC Treaty concluded, the French Government proposed
The European Defense Community (EDC) as a way to further integrate Europe. This time the
European nations were asked to consider military integration, which was another effort to
prevent future wars on the Continent. Additionally, the EDC was a way to restore German armed
forces to help in the defense of the west against Soviet aggression.
West Germany was self-governing under Chancellor Adenauer, although it was still
denied the sovereign right to maintain armed forces by the Allied occupation authorities, and was
not allowed to seek UN or NATO membership. But as Cold War tensions rose, views on German
re-armament changed. The Prague Putsch and the blockade of Berlin in 1948, followed by the
detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in 1949, and finally the invasion of South
Korea by Communist forces on June 25, 1950, made France and its NATO allies realize how
vulnerable they were to the Communist forces arrayed on the eastern half of their continent.
Parallels were seen between the invasion of western-backed South Korea by Communist North
Korea and the People’s Republic of China, and a possible invasion of unarmed West Germany
by East German and Soviet forces. Adenauer, the leader of West Germany, writes that he was
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“firmly convinced that Stalin was planning the same procedure for Western Germany as had
been used in Korea.”76 The American Government agreed, and saw the need for Germany to rearm so it could help in the defense of Western Europe. At the September, 1950, meeting of the
Allied foreign ministers, the United States announced that it was willing to send additional
military forces to Western Europe, but on the condition that Germany was allowed to re-arm so it
could contribute to its own defense. The communiqué issued by the foreign ministers states that
they would further study “German participation in an integrated force for the defense of
European freedom.”77 They welcomed German armed forces to help defend Western Europe, but
on the condition that they were not under the independent command of the German Government.
German re-armament was a contentious issue for France, where memories of German
aggression were still fresh. Monnet suggested to Prime Minister René Pleven a plan in which
Germany would re-arm within the context of a supranational European Army, similar in structure
to the ECSC. Pleven was a former Minister of Defense, and as Prime Minister he fought to
ensure the ECSC Treaty was successfully ratified by the National Assembly. Pleven put the
proposal before the French cabinet, and it became known as the Pleven Plan. The Plan proposed
the creation of a European Ministry of Defense responsible to an assembly and a council of the
national defense ministers, in a structure that mirrored that of the ECSC. This new supranational
Community would also control procurement and planning with war industries. Under the
umbrella of the European Army all national militaries would still be controlled by their national
governments, except for the German contingent which would be broken up and integrated into
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units from the other member-states. Pleven announced this plan to the National Assembly in a
speech on October 24, 1950. The Assembly endorsed the plan in principle by a vote of 343 to
220.78 However, the Plan initially received little support from France’s NATO allies. General
Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, said that the Pleven Plan
presented “every kind of obstacle, difficulty, and fantastic notion that misguided humans could
put into one package.”79 Questions were raised about the Plan’s compatibility with the existing
structure of the Atlantic Alliance.
Although the Cold War situation precipitated the Pleven Plan, it was far more significant
than a simple a Cold War military measure. It was another attempt at European integration, this
time in the military sphere. Schuman reinforced this belief during the negotiations of the EDC
Treaty, saying, “what we want is not an improvisation imposed on us by immediate necessity.
The work we seek to create will not be limited by time. It must become a durable structure, the
expression of a European Community that has at last been founded.”80 Adenauer expresses the
same view in his memoirs, “the Pleven Plan was not an improvisation. It was the desire of the
French Government that the European governments should achieve agreement on a permanent
and lasting institution.”81 A conference, similar to the Schuman Plan Conference, was called in
Paris to formulate the EDC Treaty.
The EDC Conference convened in Paris on February 15, 1951. Schuman announced to
the other delegations that the French Government was “convinced that Europe cannot be brought
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to life at once like a Utopia. It will come about slowly. It is already in process of evolution piece
by piece and step by step.”82 He further said of the EDC proposal, “within the framework of
Atlantic armed forces there will be a European Army as a permanent instrument of the security
of our continent and as an essential element of European integration.”83 The draft EDC Treaty
also emphasizes the integrationist aims of the proposed institution. Article 38 of the Treaty
declares that the EDC would be another step towards a future “federal or confederal structure.”84
Several nations attending the conference remained skeptical of the initial Pleven Plan, and
certain provisions were modified.
One modification was that the power of the proposed Ministry of Defense was weakened,
and therefore the supranational aspect was limited. Due to objections from the Benelux nations
the proposed single Minister of Defense was replaced with a committee. But the most important
modification was the chain-of-command. The original Pleven Plan was modified to be more
compatible with NATO, and the proposed European Army was placed under the direct control of
the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, who was, and would always continue to be, an
American. This was articulated in Article 18.1 of the EDC Treaty, which states, “the competent
Supreme Commander responsible to NATO is empowered… to ensure that the European
Defense Forces are organized, equipped, instructed, and prepared in a satisfactory way.” 85 This
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subordination of the proposed European Army to an American commander was one of the
factors that prohibited the ratification of the Treaty, as the EDC’s European identity was lost.
All six member-states of the ECSC signed the EDC Treaty on May 25, 1952. But
ultimately, although it was the French Government who originally proposed the creation of the
EDC, it was the French Government which failed to have the Treaty ratified. After the previous
legislative elections in June, 1951, the French political landscape changed greatly. In these
elections the Gaullist RPF party received the most seats in the Assembly, with 120, and the
Communists won the popular vote and received 100 seats.86 Both groups opposed the EDC
Treaty, while the Socialists under Guy Mollet were split on the issue. Prime Minister Antoine
Pinay, a supporter of the EDC, lost a vote of confidence soon before he was to introduce the
Treaty to the Assembly. Several governments later, Pierre Mendès-France became Prime
Minister and brought the Treaty to the Assembly in August, 1954. In this government Robert
Schuman was replaced as Foreign Minister by Georges Bidault, after having held the post since
1948. Both Mendès-France and Bidault opposed the EDC Treaty as it was written.87
Mendès-France went to Brussels on August 23, 1954, in order to try and persuade the
other member states to agree on modifications to the EDC Treaty. It was clear that the Treaty had
no chance of ratification in the National Assembly without modifications. One of MendèsFrance’s proposals was to restrict the Treaty so it only applied to units stationed in Germany.88
The meetings lasted until the early morning of August 24, but he failed to achieve any
86

"Quatrième République - IIe Législature 1951-1956," Assemblée Nationale,
http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/?url=http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/leg4rep.asp#2leg&title
=site%20de%20l'Assembl%C3%A9e%20nationale (accessed July 29, 2014).
87

Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First, 254.

88

Nora Beloff, The General Says No: Britain's Exclusion from Europe (Baltimore, MD: Penguin,

1963), 67.

39

concessions. At the subsequent press conference he refused to announce how he would vote
when the Treaty was put before the National Assembly.89
On August 30, 1954, the Treaty was rejected by the National Assembly with 319 votes
against the Treaty and 264 votes for.90 The Gaullists and Communists opposed the Treaty, and
the Socialists split 50 in favor and 53 against.91 The Treaty failed despite vocal support for it in
the Assembly from Robert Schuman, leader of the Christian-democratic Mouvement Républicain
Populaire (MRP).92 The debate was contentious, and the reaction to the vote was almost riotous
with shouts from the benches of the far-left and far-right. After the results were announced, the
deputies who voted against the Treaty sang the Marseillaise in the Hémicycle of the Palais
Bourbon, while the delegates in the center who supported the Treaty left the chamber.
Each party that opposed the Treaty did so for different reasons. The Socialists split with
half supporting and half opposing the Treaty because the European dimension of the Treaty was
lost during the revisions of the original Pleven Plan, which now placed the entire EDC under the
command of an American. The Communists voted against the Treaty because they were antiNATO by definition. The Gaullists opposed the Treaty because, along with members of the farright, they opposed delegating French sovereignty to European institutions. General de Gaulle
was appalled at the prospect of surrendering the sovereignty of the French armed forces,
especially to the Americans. In his memoirs he writes that the EDC Treaty meant “handing over
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the command of this stateless assemblage lock, stock, and barrel to the United States of
America.”93 Subjecting the EDC to an American commander went against the Gaullist view of
European integration, which advocated for a strong Europe as a ‘Third Force’ between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
Although General Eisenhower criticized the original Pleven Plan, the American
Government strongly supported the revisions which made the EDC subordinate to NATO. John
Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State under now-President Eisenhower, said of the
rejection of the Treaty, “it is a tragedy that in one country nationalism, abetted by Communism,
has asserted itself so as to endanger the whole of Europe.”94 The defeat of the Treaty also meant
that another agreement was necessary to allow for German re-armament.
The rejection of the EDC was a setback for the European integration movement, but it
was only temporary. In his memoirs, Monnet puts the rejection of the EDC in perspective by
contrasting it with the ECSC, “coal and steel had been supreme for only a century: the army, on
the other hand, had immemorial traditions. Its symbols were the flag and uniform: both were
regarded as sacred.”95 France was unwilling to relinquish sovereignty over the armed forces,
particularly to the Americans, but it was willing to continue integration in other policy areas.
Monnet left office as President of the High Authority of the ECSC on June 3, 1955. He
was replaced by fellow Frenchman René Mayer, a former Prime Minister and a strong supporter
of the Community. Monnet announced his decision not to seek another term as President soon
after the defeat of the EDC Treaty. His decision surprised many members of the High Authority
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because Monnet was the embodiment of the ECSC and of supranational integration in general. It
was he who proposed the ECSC to Schuman and led the negotiations that drafted the Treaty.
Edmond Wellenstein, the Secretary of the High Authority from the Netherlands, said of Monnet,
“he was the High Authority,” and likewise, Albert Coppé, the Belgian Vice President of the High
Authority, described Monnet as “the personification of the High Authority.”96
Monnet chose to leave because he believed he could do more to accomplish further
European integration without the responsibilities of public office. He told the Common
Assembly of the ECSC that he resigned “in order that I may have complete freedom of action
and of expression in helping to achieve European unity – a real and concrete unity.”97 Monnet
went on to establish the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. The Committee
brought together trade union and political leaders from all the Community member-states.
Almost every political party in the Community was represented except for the Gaullists,
Communists, and the Italian Socialists under the leadership of Pietro Nenni.98
At the time of his departure, Monnet believed that European integration was progressing.
Although the EDC Treaty failed, the proper functioning of the ECSC proved that supranational
integration was possible. Monnet described the ECSC in a speech to the National Press Club in
Washington, DC, before he was President of the High Authority, saying it was “a breach in the
citadel of national sovereignty which bars the route to the unity of Europe.”99 This breach
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continued to widen for the rest of the decade and culminated in 1957 with the Treaties of Rome
that established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom). These two Communities were yet further advances in supranational
integration.

The Treaties of Rome: Two New Communities
In the mid-1950s, the French Government desired an atomic energy treaty. The MendèsFrance government fell in February, 1955, and the new government under Edgar Faure was more
open to integration, but only slightly. Faure’s government had nine ministers who supported the
EDC, mostly Christian-democrats, and six ministers who opposed the EDC, mainly Gaullists.100
Faure demonstrated his support for supranational integration in a speech to the Assembly in
1955, announcing, “a true organization cannot be given too loose a formula, cannot become a
mere club or conference of ambassadors; if the term ‘supranationality’ is alarming, let us say that
nevertheless it must be given the power of decision.”101 Furthermore, in the elections of January
2, 1956, the Gaullists lost five-sixths of their seats in the Assembly, and the RPF party no longer
existed. Guy Mollet, the leader of the Socialist party, became Prime Minister and chose Robert
Marjolin as his technical adviser on European policy. Mollet had support from the center and the
left for his European policy, and from the right for his Algerian policy, and therefore presided
over one of the strongest governments of the Fourth Republic. He used this strong position to
steer the French Government back towards the path of further integration.
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France had large civil and military atomic ambitions and desired a European organization
for peaceful civilian atomic energy resources, particularly after the 1956 Suez Crisis which
showed that Europe was far too reliant on Middle Eastern oil. At the same time, the Benelux
nations and West Germany were interested in expanding European economic integration, which
began under the ECSC. These nations desired a European Economic Community to facilitate
trade for their manufactured goods. Marjolin, the economist and advisor to Mollet, advocated for
liberalized trade in a Common Market and believed that it would be very beneficial to France. In
1955 he described France as “the most protectionist country in western Europe,”102 and that
summer he wrote that for the future of French economic growth “it is necessary to integrate
[France] into a larger entity in which all trade restrictions will be progressively abolished; not
only quotas, but also customs duties.”103 Marjolin worked to rally support for the EEC in France,
at a time when it had few supporters.
On May 14, 1955, the Common Assembly passed a resolution asking for the foreign
ministers of The Six to “call one or several intergovernmental conferences to develop, with the
appropriate assistance from the institutions of the Community, the necessary treaty proposals to
achieve the next steps of European integration.”104 The foreign ministers of The Six responded at
their meeting in June, 1955, at Messina. They appointed Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium to lead a
committee to investigate and make proposals for greater economic integration and for greater
integration in the field of atomic energy. The French members of the committee included Pierre
102
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Uri, a close associate of Monnet, Robert Marjolin, another associate of Monnet’s, former
Secretary-General of the OEEC, and advisor to Prime Minister Mollet, and Félix Gaillard, who
later became the youngest Prime Minister in the history of France.105 The committee’s report was
written mainly by Uri.106 As to further economic integration, the Spaak Committee called for the
creation of a Common Market, with the gradual elimination of internal tariffs between The Six, a
common external tariff on goods imported from outside the Community, free movement of labor
and capital among The Six, and an institutional structure similar to that of the ECSC and led by a
Commission.107 The Committee also proposed integrating the civilian atomic energy industries
of The Six, but not integrating any traditional types of energy.
The Spaak Report was the basis for the subsequent intergovernmental conferences which
drafted the Treaties of Rome that established the EEC and Euratom. The bells atop the Capitoline
Hill tolled as the representatives of The Six signed the Treaties on March 25, 1957. After the
Treaties were signed, all eyes were on France for the ratification process, because the French
National Assembly previously caused the downfall of the EDC Treaty in 1954.
The negotiators had France in mind when they drafted the Rome Treaties, especially the
EEC Treaty. The institutions created for the two new Communities were on the same basis as the
institutions of the ECSC. But, the Treaties intentionally avoided the terms “supranational,”
“High Authority,” and “federal” so as to avoid the impression that The Six were forfeiting too
much sovereignty – the fear that previously doomed the EDC Treaty in the National Assembly.
In place of a “High Authority” there was a Commission to govern each Community, and the two
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new Communities shared the Parliamentary Assembly (formerly the Common Assembly) and
the Court of Justice with the ECSC. However, the executives and the Councils of Ministers of
the three Communities were separate. Additionally, the Councils of Ministers of the two new
Communities had slightly expanded oversight powers to give the national governments more
control over the institutions.
France received additional concessions in the form of an association agreement between
the EEC and France’s former African colonies. Initially, the dependent territories of The Six
were not expected to be included in the agreement, but France insisted. France had the most to
gain from this association agreement because 98% of the population of the territories included in
the agreement lived in the former French West Africa, the former French Equatorial Africa, the
former Belgian Congo, Madagascar, and the former Italian Somaliland.108 The former French
West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar made up the overwhelming majority of
these territories. These areas gained commercial privileges and development aid from the EEC.
Crucially, the Community centrally administered the development aid to these territories. This
was more appealing to the leaders of the newly-independent African states, who had difficulty
accepting development aid directly from their former colonial masters.
At home, Marjolin succeeded in gaining support for the EEC from the French farmers,
who were the main constituents for center-right politicians and therefore helped assure the
Treaties’ ratification. In Paris, both Prime Minister Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian
Pineau supported the Rome Treaties, but former Prime Minister Mendès-France, who previously
opposed the EDC Treaty, did not.109
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The EEC Treaty was ratified by all the legislatures of The Six, including the French
National Assembly on August 2, 1957. The Treaty entered into effect on January 1, 1958, along
with the Euratom Treaty whose ratification was also successful. Professor Hallstein of Germany
became President of the EEC Commission, the most prestigious office in the structure of the
three Communities. Marjolin was one of the two French representatives on the EEC
Commission. He was responsible for economics and finance, and served as Vice President of the
Commission until January, 1967.

Conclusion
In the first decade and a half after the Second World War, important progress was made
towards European integration with the goal of an eventual federation. It was the French
Government that proposed the first Community, it was France that prevented the creation of the
EDC, and it was France which proposed Euratom and was influential in the drafting of the EEC
Treaty. No one contributed more to this effort than Jean Monnet. President Kennedy, in a letter
written just before his assassination, said of Monnet, “under your inspiration, Europe has moved
closer to unity in less than twenty years than it had done before in a thousand. You and your
associates have built with the mortar of reason and the brick of economic and political interest.
You are transforming Europe by the power of a constructive idea.”110 In his memoirs, Monnet
reflects back on this period of great change and progress, “looking back at that midcentury
period one can hardly fail to be struck by the extraordinary ferment in men’s minds about the
idea of European unity. The political parties and militant organizations dealt with it in their
manifestoes; statesmen discussed it in their speeches; articles were devoted to it in the press. The
London Times and The Economist published admirable editorials worthy of Jay’s, Madison’s,
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and Hamilton’s Federalist Papers.”111 Monnet was the leader and greatest contributor to
European integration during this era.
Although the process of European unification was far from finished, great strides were
made during the postwar years. The formation of the three Communities demonstrated that the
nations of Western Europe were capable of delegating their sovereignty to central institutions, as
Monnet and Schuman originally proposed. When describing his measure of success for the
process of European integration in 1953, Monnet stated that success “is whether an authority
created freely by six nations divided for so many centuries by their national sovereignty can take
its decisions in the interest of these six nations, and then have its decisions carried out by the
enterprises of the nations. For the first time in centuries, Europe is doing just that.”112
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PART II
THE AGE OF THE GENERAL
CHAPTER 1
DE GAULLE’S DIFFERING VIEWS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

During the 1950s, France proposed the first steps towards supranational European
integration. It was the Frenchmen Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman who proposed the European
Coal and Steel Community in May, 1951, and it was Monnet who became the first President of
the High Authority of this Community. It was Prime Minister René Pleven who proposed the
European Defense Community in October, 1951, although this effort was not successful. Finally,
it was under Prime Minister Guy Mollet that France pushed for a European Atomic Energy
Community paired with the European Economic Community desired by the Germans, both of
which came into effect on January 1, 1958. But this period of supranational integration came to
an end with General de Gaulle’s rise to power on June 1, 1958. It was President de Gaulle who
halted supranational integration during the 1960s, largely because he opposed delegating national
sovereignty to European institutions.

The Advent of the Fifth Republic
The National Assembly invested General de Gaulle as Prime Minister in June, 1958. He
came to power not because he had a popular mandate, nor because he enjoyed strong support
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from the Assembly. Rather, the Assembly elected de Gaulle as Prime Minister to fulfill the
demands of the mutinous French Army, and thereby avoid a civil war.
On May 13, 1958, French settlers in Algeria, supported by the French Army, seized
control of Algiers and the surrounding cities of French Algeria. The settlers and the army feared
that the government in Paris was on the verge of negotiating with the Arab rebels who since
1954 were waging a war to create an independent Algeria. The French settlers feared that if
Algeria became independent they would find themselves living in a foreign land, cut off from
France. The army opposed Algerian independence because it was still recovering from the loss
of French Indochina to a nationalist uprising and particularly its humiliating defeat at the hands
of the Viet Minh during the Battle of Diên Biên Phu.
The army and the French settlers were now in control of Algeria, and refused to take
orders from the government in Paris, who they feared was planning to abandon them. The army
demanded that General de Gaulle form a government in Paris to resolve the situation – although
it is important to note that de Gaulle was not part of the uprising itself, he was just seen as a
trustworthy leader by the military rebels. If the Assembly refused to nominate de Gaulle to lead a
government, the rebels threatened to launch an invasion of metropolitan France. The Assembly
at first refused, and the rebel factions of the army landed in Corsica and occupied the island.
France was on the verge of civil war, and the situation looked alarmingly similar to that
of Spain in 1936, when military rebels overthrew the Spanish Republic and instituted a military
dictatorship under Francisco Franco. De Gaulle sought to avoid this, and he entered into
negotiations with leading parliamentarians to be named the next Prime Minister, in fulfillment of
the army’s demands. The General did not want to give the appearance of staging a coup, and
required the Assembly to legally elect him Prime Minister as the Constitution stipulated. The
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National Assembly reluctantly complied, and invested de Gaulle as Prime Minister on June 1,
1958. The legal coup d’état was successful.
Soon after de Gaulle became Prime Minister, he proposed a new constitution which
created the Fifth Republic. Primarily, the new constitution increased the executive power of the
president, who was merely a figurehead during the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle wrote that he
instituted the constitutional changes because he “wanted the Republic’s institutions to be such
that the government’s means matched its responsibilities.”113 This was accomplished in the
strengthening of the President’s power, and the new Republic was able to end the days of
indecision and impotence which characterized the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle was elected
president under the new constitution and took office on January 8, 1959.
De Gaulle styled himself as a strong leader who could break through the deadlock of
parliamentary politics which previously crippled the Fourth Republic. He portrayed himself
almost as a monarch, and claimed to be above mere party politics. Emmanuel d’Astier, the
Minister of the Interior in de Gaulle’s provisional wartime government, described the General’s
style of leadership, “he was to make of Nietzche, Charles Maurras, and Machiavelli a very
personal salad.”114 But although some of his opponents styled him as a fascist due to the way he
came to power, he certainly was not. He was a staunch Catholic who fought against Nazism and
Fascism during the war to liberate France.
The General was convinced of France’s status as a great power and he sought to reclaim
French prestige after the Second World War. He led the Free French during the war and fought
tirelessly to reassert France’s independence. In 1943, when de Gaulle left London to establish his
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provisional government in the recently-liberated city of Algiers, he had a farewell conversation
with the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Eden told de Gaulle that the Free French
caused more problems for the British government than all of the other European allies combined,
to which de Gaulle replied, “I don’t doubt that, France is a great power.” 115 No other quote from
the General is a better summation of his beliefs.

Economic Reforms and The Implementation of the Treaty of Rome
The increased executive power of the presidency allowed de Gaulle to make the
important economic changes required for implementing the EEC and Euratom Treaties. Out of
the six nations that constituted the EEC, France had to make the most changes to its domestic
economy in order to be compatible with the Community.116 Additionally, France had a multitude
of economic problems in 1958. The budget deficit was two hundred billion francs, the foreign
debt was three billion dollars, the government had no more than six hundred and thirty million
dollars in gold or foreign currency, and there were no more sources of foreign credit available to
France.117 De Gaulle acted swiftly to prepare France for the first round of tariff reductions that
the Treaty of Rome required. He devalued the franc, raised taxes, and curtailed government
spending, all within six months from when the new constitution came into effect.118 Monnet, the
leader of the French Economic Modernization Plan after the war, approved of these reforms, and
described them as “sensible and courageous monetary measures.”119
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The first tariff cuts and quota removals specified in the Treaty of Rome took effect on
January 1, 1959. At France’s suggestion The Six decided to accelerate all future tariff reductions
in advance of the deadlines specified in the Treaty. Overall, Treaty implementation was swift
during de Gaulle’s tenure. By 1961, The Six removed all intra-Community import and export
quotas, and by 1962 reduced all intra-Community customs duties to 50% of their pre-EEC levels.
The last customs tariffs were removed on July 1, 1968, 18 months earlier than the Treaty
specified.120
The General understood the potential of the EEC as a trading bloc that had great benefits
for the French economy and for the economies of the other member-states. He hoped that an
increased liberalization of trade would revitalize the French economy, and the Common Market
worked towards this end. This new policy of trade liberalization was a sharp break from the
former protectionist trade policies that were in place for generations. De Gaulle describes the
new trade policy in his memoirs, “this was nothing less than a revolution. For the [economic
recovery] plan advised us to disengage France from the old system of protectionism she had
practiced for a century.”121 In fact, agricultural protectionism, the cornerstone of previous French
economic policies, dated back to Jules Méline the Minister of Agriculture during the 1880s.122 In
the words of de Gaulle, these former protectionist policies “isolated and lulled” France “while
vast currents of trade energized the world market.”123
The new French economic policy of liberalized trade succeeded in reinvigorating the
economy. Robert Marjolin, the French economist and Vice-President of the EEC Commission,
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writes, “it was France that derived the most benefit from the trade liberalization which the Treaty
of Rome prescribed or indirectly brought about.”124 The French economy grew steadily under
these new policies. French GNP rose by 7.9% in 1960, 4.6% in 1961, and 6.8% in 1962.
Additionally, during these years there was an average increase in industrial production of 5.4%
and an increase in agricultural production of more than 5%.125
During this time of economic reforms, de Gaulle’s support for the EEC appeared to be
strong because the reduction in tariffs mandated by the Treaty of Rome were in line with his
economic plans, and the economic success of the Community rapidly became evident. From the
implementation of the EEC in 1958 until 1961, the Community’s GNP increased by 32%,
between 1958 and 1963 the industrial production of the Community increased by 40%, and
between 1953 and 1961 steel production among The Six nearly doubled.126 Also, most
importantly for de Gaulle’s trade policies, between 1958 and 1963 intra-Community trade almost
doubled, with an average annual increase of 19%.127 This economic growth continued throughout
de Gaulle’s term as president and lasted until the end of the decade.

The Common Agricultural Policy
On EEC issues, de Gaulle fought fiercely on behalf of France’s national interests. In
particular, he firmly supported the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Agriculture was very important to France, because 23% of the French workforce was involved in
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agriculture and almost half of the total farm production of The Six came from France. 128 The
General described his fondness for French agricultural workers – some of his main constituents –
using a grandiloquence which only he could employ, “being the man that I am, how could I fail
to be moved and concerned as I watched the gradual eclipse of this rustic society, immemorially
established in its enduring occupations and enclosed by its traditions; this world of ancient
churches, close-knit families, the eternal cycle of plowing, sowing and harvesting; this land of
ancestral legends.”129 Because the farmers were important constituents of both de Gaulle and his
party, the CAP was strongly supported by de Gaulle’s government.
In contrast to the importance France placed on the CAP, West Germany, the second most
powerful Community nation, had little interest in formulating a common policy when it came to
agriculture and instead focused on industry. During the Rome Treaty negotiations, Germany and
Belgium did not want agriculture to be covered by the EEC, but France insisted and made it a
condition of its membership in the new Community. De Gaulle believed that the CAP was a
significant benefit of French membership in the EEC, and he writes, “if I embraced the Common
Market forthwith, it was as much because of our position as an agricultural country as for the
spur it would give our industry.”130 Because of the Germans’ lack of interest, the CAP
negotiations dragged on with no end in sight.
De Gaulle acted decisively to ensure the completion of the CAP negotiations. On
December 9, 1961, he announced that France refused to implement the next round of tariff cuts,
which were due at the end of the year, if there was no agreement on the CAP. The Rome Treaty
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set the deadline for the CAP negotiations to be December 31, 1961, and de Gaulle demanded that
this deadline be maintained. Marjolin describes the importance of the CAP to de Gaulle’s
government, “I was convinced that if there were no agreement on a common agricultural policy,
France would pull out of the Common Market.”131 De Gaulle confirms this view of the situation
in his memoirs, “our ministers in Brussels, Couve de Murville, Baumgartner, and Pisani, made it
quite clear that we were prepared to withdraw from the Community if our requirements were not
met.”132 The deadline for negotiations was set, and de Gaulle jeopardized the Treaty of Rome in
order to leverage a favorable deal.
In Bonn, de Gaulle’s threat to ignore the mandated tariff cuts did not fall on deaf ears.
Any delay in tariff reductions would be detrimental to West German industry, so the threat of
delaying the tariff reduction brought the Germans to the negotiating table. The Six reached an
agreement, on January 14, 1962, after a marathon series of meetings in the Council of Ministers.
Both sides agreed to negotiate past the December 31 deadline because so much time was
required to reach a complete agreement. Later that year, Walter Hallstein, the President of the
EEC Commission, described the negotiations as entailing, “forty-five separate meetings, seven of
them at night; a total of 137 hours of discussion, with 214 hours in subcommittee; 582,000 pages
of documents; three heart attacks.”133 The CAP negotiations were grueling, but the agreement
was a major political victory for de Gaulle.
The General risked the Treaty’s implementation in order to get his way, and received
good terms on the final agreement. Notably, the EEC would centrally cover the cost of
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subsidizing French wheat. The CAP was the only policy area that de Gaulle believed the
Community should have a larger role, and only because it benefitted France’s national interests.
In principle de Gaulle refused to delegate powers to the Community institutions, but all decisions
on the CAP were taken in the Council of Ministers, which made decisions unanimously, thus
ensuring de Gaulle had a say in these matters of policy.
De Gaulle’s Differing View on European Integration
Under de Gaulle’s new constitution, the president had the role of setting foreign policy,
and therefore also European policy. De Gaulle completed decolonization of the French Empire
with the independence of Algeria in 1962, and could therefore focus his efforts on Europe.
Maurice Couve de Murville served as de Gaulle’s foreign minister for 10 years and was the
longest serving foreign minister in the history of France. Couve de Murville was a strong voice
in the Council of Ministers of the EEC and was a staunch defender of de Gaulle’s policies, which
were unpopular with the other member-states of the EEC.
De Gaulle held a differing view on European integration than Jean Monnet and those who
favored supranational integration. Robert Marjolin wrote that Europe at this time “was
dominated by two great currents of thinking, one embodied by Jean Monnet and one embodied
by General de Gaulle.”134 The General opposed delegating French sovereignty to Community
institutions, and instead envisioned intergovernmental co-operation between sovereign nations.
De Gaulle was adamantly opposed to the Community’s ultimate goal of creating a federal
Europe. He ridiculed the federalists, and pejoratively referred to Monnet as “The Inspirer” of the
Community institutions which he opposed.135 De Gaulle distrusted Monnet, and the General’s
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followers accused Monnet of being unpatriotic because he wanted to sacrifice French
sovereignty, and also because he never fought in the First World War, unlike almost all other
men of his generation.136 Additionally, Monnet spent much time during both wars in London and
Washington, which led de Gaulle to accuse Monnet and his policies of being un-French, and he
sarcastically described Monnet as “a great American.”137
De Gaulle’s view that state sovereignty is inviolable is deeply rooted in the tradition of
the French Revolution. The Revolution taught “il n’y a que l’individu et l’état (there is nothing
but the individual and the state).”138 This was the basis of the European political system in the
modern era, with the nation-state as the supreme political entity. De Gaulle expounded this
belief, “at present there is and can be no Europe other than a Europe of states – except, of course
for myths, fictions, and pageants.”139 Additionally, the General writes in his memoirs that he
sought to institute a “concert of European States” to “increase their interdependence and
solidarity.”140 This belief in Europe des patries was in sharp contrast to those who favored
supranational integration.
De Gaulle’s reluctance to sacrifice French sovereignty to the Community explains why
he was so critical of the EEC Commission. He describes them as “so-called executives installed
at the head of common institutions by virtue of the decisions of integration which had prevailed
before my return [to office].”141 As to the idea of a central European government, de Gaulle
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writes that he had “no taste for make-believe,” and he describes those who supported giving
more power to the central institutions as “myth mongers.”142 In September, 1960, de Gaulle went
so far as to propose to Jan de Quay, the Dutch Foreign Minister, that the Treaty of Rome should
be revised so as to place the Commission directly subordinate to the intergovernmental Council
of Ministers.143 This would have eliminated the supranational character of the Community.
Stanley Hoffman, the French-Austrian political scientist, in 1964 describes the General’s
ideology, “the General’s first concern, attested to throughout his memoirs [of the Second World
War], is to ensure what he calls the grandeur of France and, as a prerequisite of this, to maintain
France’s independence.”144 De Gaulle was only willing to accept an intergovernmental
Community in which the nation-states were still in control. The General writes in his memoirs,
“our constitution, which stipulates that French sovereignty belongs to the French people, which
shall exercise it through its representatives and by means of referendums, and makes no
provisions for any kind of exception.”145 The voting record of the European Parliamentary
Assembly illuminates the difference between de Gaulle’s vision of European integration and the
views held by the federalists. The three main blocs in the Assembly, the Christian Democrats, the
Socialists, and the Liberals all supported further supranational integration. But the smaller
Gaullist bloc acted as an automatic opposition to proposals to extend the power of the central
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institutions.146 In 1962, the Assembly renamed itself the ‘European Parliament,’ in part to give
the appearance that the Community was a real European government.147
Although de Gaulle disliked the supranational Community institutions, he desired a
Community that could play an important role in world affairs. Hoffman writes, “the General, a
French nationalist, is also a European nationalist… Just as he wants to prevent France from being
a mere pawn on the international chessboard, the General wants to assure that Europe – which he
sees as the mother of civilization – can again become one of the principal players after having for
twenty years been just a stake through the fault of its division.”148 De Gaulle wanted Europe to
be independent of the United States of America, and he distrusted NATO because the European
militaries were subject to an American commander.
De Gaulle’s fear of American interference was in part due to the General’s wartime
experiences. During the war, Roosevelt tried to replace him as the leader of the Free French and
never recognized his organization as the provisional French government. Also, de Gaulle was not
told by the Americans or the British about the Normandy invasion until soon before it happened.
At first, the British and the Americans wanted to occupy France after the invasion and place it
under the administration of the Allied armies, instead of allowing de Gaulle to govern liberated
France.
The General’s views on NATO were similar to his views on the Community institutions.
Instead of the NATO integrated military command led by an American, he desired
intergovernmental co-ordination of the national militaries. He claimed that NATO manifested
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“the military and political subordination of Western Europe to the United States of America.”149
De Gaulle wanted an alliance, but Europe needed to have a larger role in making NATO
decisions. De Gaulle’s foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, outlined the Gaullist view
that NATO was too US-centric during a speech to the National Assembly, “if Europe reacts, it is
not in terms of itself, but in relation to the United States, and that is indeed the real problem. That
is the problem, for the United States occupies such an important – shall I say predominant –
place in NATO.”150 This American predominance in the Atlantic Alliance threatened the
independence of Europe’s foreign and defense policy.
In 1958, only a few months after taking office, de Gaulle proposed that NATO be led by
a directory of Britain, France, and the United States – the three nuclear or soon-to-be-nuclear
powers. He hoped that this reform would reduce American influence over the alliance. De Gaulle
proposed this change in a letter to American President Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan on September 14, 1958, but the British and the American
governments rejected his proposal. In response, de Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean
Fleet from NATO command in March, 1959, and France tested its first atomic bomb in the
Algerian Sahara on February 13, 1960. Eventually, the General went on to withdraw the entire
French military from the NATO integrated command in 1966.

The Fouchet Plan
After the rejection of the General’s proposed NATO reforms, de Gaulle realized that
France could only regain its status as a great power if it was the leader of the Community. De
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Gaulle wanted to boost Europe’s strength both politically and militarily. On May 10, 1961, he
announced France’s intention to build the force de frappe, an independent French nuclear force.
This force acted as a deterrent, and gave France greater leverage in world affairs.
De Gaulle envisioned Europe as a ‘Third Force’ between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Europe therefore needed to be united on foreign policy issues in order to act as an
effective force on the world stage. Naturally, de Gaulle wanted the foreign policies of the other
members of the Community to mirror those of France, which he believed was the only great
power on the Continent.
In July, 1959, de Gaulle suggested tri-annual meetings of the foreign ministers of the
Community member-states. De Gaulle saw this as a form of basic political integration, but not
one in which French sovereignty would be sacrificed to any Community institutions. Couve de
Murville writes that basic political union was “in a sense written into the Treaties of Rome which
created the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, if
not as an idea, at least as a hope and doubtless as an intention.” 151 De Gaulle’s proposals were
therefore meant as further advancements in European integration, but they had no supranational
dimension.
At a press conference on September 5, 1960, the General announced a plan for the
leaders of The Six to meet as a committee and decide issues of foreign, defense, and economic
policy. On this proposal, Couve de Murville writes, “the original scheme was simple: periodic
and regular meetings of the leaders of the six States to co-ordinate their action in the political,
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economic, cultural, and defense domains.”152 This proposed committee would have a secretariat
based in Paris, and would be entirely intergovernmental in nature.
At the September, 1960, press conference de Gaulle also declared that intergovernmental
integration was the only acceptable form of European integration. The proposed committee was
to be made up of “states each of which, indeed, has its own genius, history and language, its own
sorrows, glories and ambitions; but States are the only entities with the right to give orders and
the power to be obeyed.”153 However, the Commission and the Benelux nations opposed this
idea and especially the location of the secretariat, fearing it was an attempt to impose French
hegemony over the Community.154 Monnet also opposed this plan because it sought to limit the
supranational character of European integration. In response to the General’s press conference,
Monnet stated, “de Gaulle’s proposals are based on notions that are out of date… They
completely ignore what a series of failures has taught us: that it is impossible to solve Europe’s
problems among states which retain full national sovereignty.”155 Monnet saw de Gaulle’s
proposals not as progress towards European integration, but rather as a step backwards.
In March, 1961, de Gaulle appointed Christian Fouchet to create a plan to implement
these proposals. Fouchet was a French diplomat and the ambassador to Denmark. He was a
Gaullist from the start, and was one of the few Frenchmen to join de Gaulle in 1940. On July 18,
1961, the Conference of Heads of State or Government met at Bonn. The statement issued at the
end of the conference states that the leaders of The Six desired “to give shape to the will for
political union already implicit in the Treaties establishing the European Communities” and “to
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hold at regular intervals meetings whose aim will be to compare the views and concert their
policies and to reach common positions in order to further the political union of Europe.”156 A
committee, led by Fouchet, was established to draft a Treaty on Political Union to realize these
goals.
The Fouchet Committee unveiled the draft Treaty on November 2, 1961. The Treaty
proposed an “indissoluble” Union of States, governed by a European Council, a parliament, and
a Political Commission.157 The Council members would be ministers appointed by their
respective governments, and the Council would meet “every four months at the Head of State or
Government level.”158 The national governments would have a large role, and the Council’s
decisions would be made unanimously. Also, Article 6 states that if a nation abstained from
voting, the decision of the majority would not be binding upon them, thus the sovereignty of the
member-states was not compromised.159 The Political Commission would be made up of senior
foreign ministry officials from the member-states. The Commission would work to carry out the
decisions of the European Council but was otherwise purely advisory, as was the parliament.
Most revolutionarily, this new Union of States would replace the supranational
institutions of the existing three Communities. Article 16 of the draft Treaty calls for the
“gradual establishment of an organization centralizing, within the Union, the European
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Communities.”160 This new Union would have forcefully re-asserted the primacy of the national
governments over the supranational Community institutions.
In fact, de Gaulle further revealed his intentions to eliminate the supranational
Community system in a note to his Prime Minister, Michel Debré, on September 30, 1960. This
memorandum is quoted by François Duchêne, “if we manage to produce a co-operative Europe
of States, the Communities will ipso facto be reduced to size. Only if we fail to produce such a
political Europe will we need to deal directly with the first fruits of integration [the
Communities].”161 This note reveals de Gaulle’s scheme to remove the supranational dimension
from the Community, and it foreshadows his later disputes with the Commission.
Negotiations on the Fouchet Plan stalled for several reasons. First, it was proposed during
a period of tense east-west relations, right after the construction of the Berlin Wall. Secondly,
Britain applied to join the Community in the summer of 1961 and the Dutch wanted to wait until
Britain joined the Community before taking any steps towards deeper integration. Finally, the
majority

of

the

member-states

simply

favored

supranational

integration

over

the

intergovernmental plan the Fouchet Committee recommended. The other member-states
dismissed the Gaullist plan to abolish the supranational institutions.
On May 15, 1962, de Gaulle held a very controversial press conference. He rejected the
belief that the nation-states of Europe would ever accept decisions made by a supranational
government, “is there a France, a Germany, an Italy… which would be ready to do, on a question
important in their eyes from a national as well as an international standpoint, what would appear
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bad to them because it was dictated by others?”162 Throughout the press conference he mocked
the federalists who supported supranational integration, thereby offending many French
politicians. De Gaulle said of supranational integration, “it is nice to dream of the marvelous
lamp that allowed Aladdin to fly above the real world. But there is no magic formula that allows
the construction of something as difficult as a united Europe. And so, when we return to reality,
and when we will have done the work, it will be time to delude ourselves with the tales of One
Thousand and One Nights.”163 This mocking comparison between a federal Europe and a fairy
tale caused a backlash in Paris.
In response to this press conference, five ministers from the MRP Christian-democratic
party, the party of Robert Schuman, resigned from the French governing coalition. Soon after,
four ministers from the Independents resigned on May 22, and then in June, 296 deputies of the
National Assembly signed a declaration advocating for supranational integration and rejecting de
Gaulle’s views on European integration.164 De Gaulle, however, unapologetically continued to
denounce supranational integration.

The Enlargement Controversy
The United Kingdom was not a member of any of the three Communities, although it was
invited to partake in the negotiations of all three Community treaties. Vice-President of the EEC
Commission Robert Marjolin, in his memoirs, quotes John Maynard Keynes’ description of
Britain in 1919 to describe Britain’s situation vis-à-vis the Community in the early 1960s.
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Keynes writes, “England still stands outside of Europe. Europe’s voiceless tremors do not reach
her. Europe is apart and England is not of her flesh and body. But Europe is solid with herself.
France, Germany, Italy… throb together, and their structure and civilization are essentially
one.”165
In 1950, Britain declined to participate in the ECSC, and in June, 1955, Britain refused to
participate in the Messina Conference which planned future integration. Britain was invited to be
represented on the Spaak Committee which drafted the Treaties of Rome, but only sent a lowlevel official who withdrew after the first few meetings. Finally, Britain created the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) as a direct competitor to the EEC, and tried to draw The Six into this
larger, Continent-wide free trade area which had no supranational institutions.
But, the EEC was far more economically successful than the EFTA, and Britain was
drawn towards the Community due to economic necessity. By 1963, British exports to the
Community totaled $2,189,000,000 and Britain did not want to remain outside the Community’s
exterior tariff.166 So on July 31, 1961, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan began the
application process for Britain to join the EEC. Monnet said of the British application to join the
Community, “entry into Europe would be good for Britain, for Europe, for the west, and for
world peace.”167 At around the same time, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway also applied to join the
Community, and it was decided that Britain would lead the accession negotiations on behalf of
the four applicants.
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All three Community treaties were open to new members, but a unanimous decision of
The Six was required to admit any new member-states. According to Article 237 of the Treaty of
Rome, “any European state may apply to become a member of the Community” and the Treaty’s
preamble encourages “other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts.”168
Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty, and Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty express similar
sentiments.
When Britain applied to join the Community, there was a debate over whether the
accession negotiations should be conducted between Britain and the Commission, or between
Britain and the governments of The Six. The French Government, supported by Britain, wanted
the negotiations to be between Britain and the six national governments.169 This view won out,
and an ad hoc intergovernmental conference convened in Brussels between representatives of
The Six and Britain.
For each issue brought up at this conference, The Six first needed to find a common
position among themselves and then present this view to the British delegation. This system was
ideal for the French, as it allowed them to try and influence the other Community members in
private before announcing their united positions on the issues. The conference was led by the
chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Commission representatives were present in a purely
advisory capacity. The Commission representatives included President Walter Hallstein of
Germany, Vice-President Robert Marjolin of France, and leading members Jean Rey of Belgium
and Jean-François Deniau of France.
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The negotiations continued for fourteen months, mainly because Britain was torn
between the Continent and the Commonwealth. If it joined the EEC, Britain needed to treat the
Commonwealth nations just like any other non-Community nations, and its special trading
relationships would end. Marjolin writes, “the Empire was dead, but the Commonwealth was still
an emotionally powerful reality.”170 Britain tried to retain as many Commonwealth ties as
possible, and the negotiations continued until January, 1963. Progress was made towards a final
agreement, although there were still unresolved issues. Monnet describes the status of the
negotiations in early 1963 in his memoirs, “the Commission thought it had found a broad area of
agreement; the British thought they were on the eve of victory.”171 But, de Gaulle abruptly ended
the negotiations before any final agreement could be reached.
On January 14, 1963, the General held a press conference in the Salle des Fêtes, the most
ornate reception room in the Élysée Palace. During this press conference, he rejected British
membership in the Community. Significantly, he did not reject Britain’s application based on the
current status of the negotiations, but rather the rejection was due to larger economic and
geopolitical reasons, particularly Britain’s close relationship to the United States. He declared
that the British economy was “obviously incompatible with the system The Six have established
quite naturally for themselves.”172 These issues were evident before the negotiations even began,
which led to the accusation that de Gaulle never had any intention of admitting Britain to the
Community.
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This fait accompli announced by de Gaulle effectively ended the negotiations, because
France’s agreement was required to approve Britain’s membership in the Community. De
Gaulle’s announcement shocked the negotiators in Brussels, as they had no prior warning of the
General’s decision. Nora Beloff, a foreign correspondent covering the negotiations for the British
newspaper The Observer, later describes the situation, “as a result of de Gaulle’s actions,
hundreds of negotiators, from senior cabinet ministers to junior officials, who had been run off
their feet working eighteen and twenty hours a day, trying to get through the tangle of dossiers,
attending the interminable committees, and lobbying other delegations, suddenly found
themselves with nothing to do.”173 All it took was one press conference, and de Gaulle changed
the course of the entire Community.
The negotiations with Britain officially ended during a meeting of the Council of
Ministers on January 29, 1963. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville represented France and
announced the French Government’s desire to end the accession negotiations, because “the
position of one of the participating delegations makes it impossible to continue the
negotiations.”174 Couve de Murville’s personal position on this issue is called into question by
the British reporter Nora Beloff, who in her book on the veto crisis claims that Couve de
Murville opposed abruptly ending the negotiations. Beloff writes of Couve de Murville’s speech
to Council, “all that they were listening to, as Couve spoke, was a faithful recording of his
master’s voice.”175 However, the Foreign Minister makes no mention of this disagreement in his
memoirs, and at the time openly supported de Gaulle’s policy.176 Whichever the case, it was the
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General who decided upon the veto and it was Couve de Murville who formally ended the
negotiations in the Council.
De Gaulle decided to veto Britain’s application to the Community for both economic and
political reasons. Economically, the General claimed that Britain was not ready to relinquish her
ties to the Commonwealth, “but the question, to know whether Great Britain can now place
herself like the Continent and with it inside a tariff which is genuinely common, to renounce all
Commonwealth preferences, to cease any pretense that her agriculture be privileged, and, more
than that, to treat her engagements with other countries of the Free Trade Area as null and void –
that is the whole question.”177 Economically, Britain expected the Community to make many
concessions during the negotiations. To Britain it was not just a matter of her joining the EEC,
but rather she wanted changes to the Community itself. Marjolin writes that Britain desired
“renegotiating, if not the Treaty itself, at least the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy,
the aim being a compromise between the Community and the British system.”178 Recognizing
how important the CAP was to de Gaulle and France, these concessions on the part of the
Community were impossible.
Politically, de Gaulle believed that if Britain joined the Community France’s power
among The Six would diminish. The Community was built on a Franco-German axis, and Britain
would upset this balance. Overall, de Gaulle saw Britain as a Trojan horse for further American
interference in the Community. President Kennedy’s reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis that
previous October demonstrated how the European nations were merely junior partners in the
Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle and Adenauer showed strong support for the United States in the
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face of the Soviet threat, but they were alarmed when the President unilaterally imposed the
blockade of Cuba without consulting the European NATO members.179 To de Gaulle it was clear
that the United States would act independently of its European allies, and therefore the European
nations must be able to act independently from the United States. De Gaulle feared that if forced
to choose between Europe and the United States, Britain would choose the United States. This
view was reinforced when Britain and the United States signed the Nassau Agreement on
December 22, 1962. Britain agreed to put its nuclear weapons under American control in the
NATO integrated command, in return for an American agreement to provide Britain with
nuclear-capable missiles.180 De Gaulle saw this as further military subjection of Europe to the
United States, and it went against his vision of Europe as a Third Force between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
De Gaulle feared Britain would drag The Six into a larger Atlantic community which
would ruin the European dimension of integration. The General said that if Britain joined the
Community “the cohesion of its members, who would be very numerous and diverse, would not
endure for long, and that ultimately it would appear as a colossal Atlantic community under
American dependence and direction, and which would quickly have absorbed the community of
Europe,” and he said that France desired “a properly European construction.”181 De Gaulle
claimed that Britain’s accession to the Community threatened the Community’s very identity,
and his views were not unfounded. Britain increasingly identified with Europe as the decade
went on, but as late as 1969, when the British people were asked which among the United States,
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the Commonwealth, and Europe was the most important to Britain, 34% said the United States,
34% said the Commonwealth, and only 21% said Europe.182 Britain was not yet ready to fully
commit herself to the Continent.
Reactions to de Gaulle’s Veto
De Gaulle’s unilateral rejection of Britain’s membership application was very
controversial, although technically he was well within his rights because a unanimous decision
among The Six was required to admit Britain to the Community. However, the idea of rejecting a
nation’s application due to a national rivalry was contrary to the core values of the Community,
and Marjolin, who was involved with the negotiations, writes, “the moral unity of the
Community was broken.”183 Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, responded to the official end
of the negotiations by saying, “what happened at Brussels yesterday was bad; bad for us; bad for
Europe; and bad for the whole free world.”184 Gaullism was unpopular in Britain, and became
increasingly so in the Community nations.
Professor Hallstein, the President of the Commission, said in a speech to the European
Parliament, “the manner in which one member government took and communicated its decision
to interrupt the negotiations is not in harmony with the duties imposed by the Community.”185 He
continued to elaborate on the seriousness of the issue, “our Community has been faced with its
first real crisis. To say this is no exaggeration; not to say it would be playing the matter down.
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The crisis is one of confidence, and that is what makes the matter so serious.” 186 Finally, he
addressed the impression that de Gaulle was attempting to control the Community, “it is also
necessary to avoid creating the impression that the Community and its aims, the Community
institutions, and the Community procedure are merely instruments of a country’s diplomacy.”187
The relationship between de Gaulle and the Hallstein Commission never recovered from this
crisis.
The only support which de Gaulle received came from Chancellor Adenauer of West
Germany, because de Gaulle had a close relationship with the Chancellor. Between September
1958 and mid-1962 they met 15 times, had over 100 hours of talks, and wrote to each other 40
times.188 On January 22, 1963, eight days after de Gaulle’s press conference, the two leaders
signed the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. The Treaty implemented political co-operation
similar to what the Fouchet Plan proposed, but the Treaty’s real significance was that it showed
that Adenauer supported de Gaulle during the backlash in the wake of the French veto.189
However, Adenauer’s favorable view of de Gaulle was not held by the majority of West
Germans. Le Monde suggested that the Franco-German agreement took the form of a formal
treaty because otherwise Adenauer feared his successors might not honor it.190 Gaullism was
unpopular in Germany, and after de Gaulle’s veto German students protested outside the French
Embassy in Bonn. Finally, when the Bundestag ratified the Franco-German Treaty they inserted
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a preamble which rejects de Gaulle’s view of European integration. This preamble was possibly
even written by Monnet and his Action Committee.191 The preamble states that West Germany
wanted to continue “the unification of Europe on the path started by the creation of the European
Communities, including the United Kingdom and other states willing to accede.”192 De Gaulle,
however, was unfazed by this and responded, “treaties are like maidens and roses, they each have
their day.”193 For de Gaulle, the Treaty’s significance was fulfilled on the day it was signed with
Adenauer’s implicit show of support for the General after the veto.
The Bundestag’s rejection of Gaullism was significant though, and before the year was
over Adenauer was forced out of office. Some parliamentarians thought he was too easily
influenced by de Gaulle, and that at the age of 87 Adenauer’s time was past. Adenauer’s
successors were more willing to disagree with de Gaulle, and the period of Franco-German
hegemony over the Community effectively ended.

Conclusion
By the time of de Gaulle’s veto, it was evident that the General opposed the fundamental
policies of the Community, and the other member-states were frustrated by de Gaulle’s unilateral
action. The General’s proposed re-working of the Community into an intergovernmental
organization under the Fouchet Plan failed in 1962, but after his veto of Britain’s membership in
1963 he once again asserted himself as the most powerful figure in the Community. There was a
high price though, the relationship between France and the Community became tenuous, and
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conflicts ensued between France and the Commission over Community policy. François
Duchêne, Monnet’s biographer and a prolific writer on the topic of European integration,
describes the years following the veto as a period of “political trench warfare” over the direction
of Community policies.194 The other member-states viewed Gaullist France as un-cooperative,
and the smaller nations of the Community resented de Gaulle’s domination of Community
policy.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EMPTY CHAIR CRISIS:
THE GENERAL AGAINST THE PROFESSOR
Before 1965, de Gaulle’s most controversial action was his veto of Britain’s application
to join the EEC. This veto conflict was mainly between the General and Britain, but the next
crisis was far more serious. During the Empty Chair Crisis, de Gaulle came into conflict with the
Community as a whole and threatened the very existence of a united Europe.

The Professor
Professor Walter Hallstein was President of the EEC Commission from its inception in
1958 until 1967. He was a German from the Rhineland, as was Chancellor Adenauer. The
Chancellor chose Hallstein to lead the German delegation to the ECSC Treaty negotiations and
later the Rome Treaties negotiations. He served as State Secretary in the German Foreign Office
during the 1950s, the highest civil service position in that Ministry, which was led by Adenauer
who served simultaneously as Foreign Minister and Chancellor. Hallstein became President of
the Commission in 1958, and was re-elected in 1962. His re-election was supported by Robert
Marjolin, the French Vice-President of the Commission. Even by this time, Gaullist France was
unpopular with the other Community nations, and so Marjolin thought it was wise for Hallstein,
a German, to remain at the head of the Community.195
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Hallstein was a federalist like Monnet, and a firm advocate of supranational integration.
His view of European integration was very different from that of General de Gaulle. Unlike de
Gaulle, the Professor did not believe that Europe could retain its system of sovereign states and
still be an effective bloc. He saw a European federation as the ultimate goal of the Community.
In his book Europe in the Making, Hallstein writes, “the nation-state will not always be accepted
as the ultimate form of political organization, as a kind of political absolute: men will no longer
worship it as an idol, as they sometimes have in the past.”196 This rejection of the nation-state
was in direct opposition to de Gaulle’s view of European integration and national sovereignty. In
his memoirs, de Gaulle writes that Hallstein was “ardently wedded to the thesis of the superstate, and bent all his skillful efforts towards giving the Community the appearance of one.”197
Hallstein believed that the supranational economic integration accomplished by the Community
was in effect a partial form of supranational political union, and this view was supported by the
Commission as a whole. In a Commission memorandum published on October 24, 1962, the
Commission declares, “what we call the economic integration of Europe is in essence a political
phenomenon. Together with the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom, the
European Economic Community forms a political union embracing the economic and social
spheres.”198 De Gaulle refused to acknowledge the Community as anything other than economic.
De Gaulle was particularly riled at how, as President of the Commission, Hallstein was treated
with privileges accorded to a world leader, when he was nothing but a civil servant in de
Gaulle’s eyes. The General writes that Hallstein “sat [in Brussels], surrounded by all the
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trappings of sovereignty, directing his colleagues… controlling several thousand officials” and
“laying claim to high honors on the occasions of his official visits.”199 With differing views such
as this, it was only a matter of time before the Hallstein Commission came into serious conflict
with the General.

The State of the Community in 1965
Morale in the Community was high in early 1965. A contentious round of CAP
negotiations over the price of cereals was resolved in December, 1964, and because the
agreement was in de Gaulle’s favor, it was assumed that the General finally committed himself
to the Community.200 Overall, the implementation of the Common Market progressed rapidly. In
January, 1965, the Commission proposed that July 1, 1968, would be the deadline for the final
removal of all intra-Community tariffs. In the previous years, The Six accomplished much under
the auspices of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom, and it was decided that the three Communities
should be entirely unified into one Community structure. The Council of Ministers first asked the
member-states to consider merging the central organs of the Communities on September 24,
1963, and the Merger Treaty, signed in April, 1965, set July 1, 1967, as the date for the
unification of the Communities’ executive institutions.
France supported this institutional reform, but only because it could be a way to limit the
Community. After the reforms, there would only be one Commission to deal with instead of
three. Additionally, the Gaullists may have seen it as a first step towards the revision of the
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Treaty of Rome.201 This change simply merged the executive bodies of the three Communities
and did not increase the power of the Commission, although it did eventually increase the
Commission’s profile as the executive body of the unified Community.
Additionally, the Franco-German relationship in 1965 had weakened since the veto crisis
in 1963. Adenauer left office in October 1963, and Ludwig Erhard succeeded him. European
integration was built on a Franco-German axis and Adenauer often sided with de Gaulle on
major issues. But the new Chancellor’s views on the Community were similar to those of
Hallstein. Also, as a strong supporter of NATO, Erhard was more of an Atlanticist and advocated
for British membership in the Community. After the departure of Adenauer, de Gaulle became
more isolated than ever among the leaders of The Six.
Hallstein saw this as an opportune time to challenge de Gaulle’s view of European
integration, not just because of his isolation within the Community, but also because 1965 was
an election year in France. The EEC greatly benefitted the French economy and so de Gaulle
could not afford to be seen as anti-Community during the election campaign.
The Professor’s Proposals
There were two issues which led to the conflict between de Gaulle and the Commission
in 1965. The first was the CAP funding plan proposed by Hallstein in March, 1965. The second
was the imminent switch from unanimous decision-making to majority voting in the Council of
Ministers effective January 1, 1966.
The first issue, the CAP funding plan, was important to de Gaulle and beneficial to
French agriculture. French farmers were some of de Gaulle’s key constituents, and so all CAP
issues were taken very seriously by de Gaulle’s government. The first CAP agreement of
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January, 1962, specified that the CAP would be funded through national contributions until at
least June 30, 1965. After the full implementation of the Common Market, it was decided that
the Commission would pay all expenses for the CAP by directly collecting all agricultural levies
which were previously collected by the national governments. There was a recent update to the
CAP policy on December 15, 1964, and as part of this agreement the Council of Ministers asked
the Commission to submit proposals on how the CAP should be funded after June 30, 1965.
Hallstein unveiled his controversial funding plan during a speech to the European
Parliament on March 24, 1965. The Professor proposed that as part of his funding plan, the
Community should gain a measure of financial independence from the national governments,
and that the European Parliament should have a larger role in determining the Community’s
budget. In his memoirs, Vice-President of the Commission Robert Marjolin makes it clear that
the proposals were “entirely the brainchild of Hallstein.”202 Marjolin thought that the proposals
went too far, but since the Commission made decisions based on consensus, he went along with
the majority viewpoint.
Hallstein’s announcement to the European Parliament in effect contained three proposals
which were interconnected. The first proposal was the plan to fund the CAP: the CAP would no
longer be funded by contributions from the national governments, but rather the Commission
would centrally collect all the agricultural levies to fund the CAP subsidies.203 Previously in
January 1962, in Council Resolution 25, the Council agreed that the CAP should eventually be
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centrally funded by agricultural levies on farm goods imported from outside the Community, but
not until the Common Market was fully implemented.204
Although this proposal is similar to Council Resolution 25, there are significant
differences. First, under Hallstein’s proposal the Commission would centrally collect all farm
levies, but it would only pay for the farm subsidies on exports from The Six which were in line
with common Community policy. If a member-state made independent bi-lateral or multi-lateral
agreements the Community would not pay these subsidies.205 This was an attempt to force the
member-states into following a unified economic policy. France had one of the most independent
trade policies of The Six at this time, and so this change was unacceptable to the French
Government. Secondly, there was an issue as to the timing of when the Commission gained
responsibility over collecting the levies and funding the CAP. Resolution 25 states that this
would come into effect when the Common Market reached its final stage of implementation,
which Article 8 of the EEC Treaty set as 1970.206 But, Hallstein proposed that the funding
changes should instead be effective as of July 1, 1967, two and a half years earlier.207
The second part of Hallstein’s proposal would make the Community responsible for its
entire budget, not just for the CAP revenues and expenditures. Under this proposal the
Commission would be responsible for centrally collecting funds raised from the common tariff
on manufactures, as well as the levies on agricultural goods. This full budgetary independence
204
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would come into effect gradually, with full implementation not until 1972.208 The Commission
would collect all revenue from the Community tariffs and levies, and cover all costs relating to
the Common Market. This plan was first suggested in Article 201 of the Rome Treaty, which
states that the financial contributions from the member-states “may be replaced by other
resources of the Community itself, in particular, by revenue accruing from the common customs
tariff when the latter has been definitely introduced. For this purpose, the Commission shall
submit proposals to the Council.”209 Although it was politically unwise, Hallstein was well
within his rights to propose this plan.
The final part of Hallstein’s proposals would expand the role of the European Parliament.
He proposed that the European Parliament should have a larger role in the budget process, which
required amending Articles 201 and 203 of the Treaty of Rome. Hallstein proposed that the
European Parliament should have the authority to amend the budget before its final approval in
the Council, and the Council would only be able to veto the amendments with a five-sixths
majority.210 A new treaty between The Six was needed to implement these changes to the Treaty
of Rome. In light of Hallstein’s other proposals, advocating for the European Parliament to have
a larger budgetary role was logical. The national parliaments of The Six provided democratic
oversight over the allocation of funds given to the Community by the individual member-states,
and now the European Parliament would provide democratic oversight for the Community.
This part of Hallstein’s proposal was particularly unacceptable to the Gaullists, because
the Treaty of Rome stated that the European Parliament was to eventually be directly elected.211
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This would make it entirely independent of the national governments. Additionally, since the
other five member-states were more supportive of the supranational institutions than France was,
the five-sixths majority required in the Council to veto the European Parliament’s proposals
seemed highly unlikely to be realized. Under these new rules, the role of the intergovernmental
Council of Ministers was drastically reduced.
Initial Reactions to Hallstein’s Proposals
Hallstein’s speech received a warm response from the European Parliament, but not from
the Gaullist delegates. The European Parliament adopted a resolution in support of the proposals,
and many of the members wanted the proposals to go even further. On May 12, 1965, the
European Parliament voted 76 to 0, with 10 Gaullists abstaining, on a resolution to give itself the
final say on all budgetary matters, instead of the Council.212 However, this was further than any
of the national governments were willing to go.
Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe supported Hallstein’s
proposals, at least in principle. The Action Committee met in West Berlin in May, 1965, to
commemorate the 20th anniversary of V-E Day and the 15th anniversary of the Schuman
Declaration. The Committee included representatives from almost all the non-Gaullist and nonCommunist political parties and trade unions in Europe, and it passed a resolution declaring
support for giving the Community its own resources and for giving the European Parliament a
larger role.213
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However, Hallstein admits that the national governments of The Six were “lukewarm” to
his proposals when they were first introduced.214 In Brussels, the Permanent Representatives of
the member-states met to discuss the proposals, and there was no clear majority support for
them.215 But the five member-states other than France wanted to consider all three of Hallstein’s
proposals simultaneously because they were interconnected. France, however, only wanted to
discuss CAP financing and saw no need to discuss the other two proposals that the French
Government opposed.
The proposed financial independence of the Community was irreconcilable with the
Gaullist view of an intergovernmental Europe. The Gaullists knew that allowing the Community
to become financially independent decreased the leverage the national governments had over the
Community institutions because the governments could no longer withhold funds. Together with
the changes to the role of the European Parliament, these proposals would greatly strengthen the
central institutions at the expense of the national governments.
The way in which Hallstein announced his proposals further justified de Gaulle’s fear
that the Community was becoming too independent of the national governments. Protocol at the
time was for major proposals from the Commission to be announced in the Council of Ministers,
but this time Hallstein made the announcement to the European Parliament instead. This was
seen as further marginalizing the role of the Council of Ministers, the only intergovernmental
part of the Community governing structure. This move alarmed the Gaullists, and shocked
national leaders in many other Community nations.216
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The Majority Voting Issue
In addition to Hallstein’s proposals, there was a second issue with even wider-reaching
effects that contributed to the crisis: the issue of majority voting in the Council of Ministers.
From 1958 until 1965 decisions in the Council of Ministers were decided unanimously. But, as
of January 1, 1966, decisions in several policy areas would be made by qualified majority vote,
as outlined in the Treaty of Rome.217 Under the current system, France had the power to veto
decisions in the Council, but under the new voting rules France could simply be outvoted.
With the move to majority voting, de Gaulle’s opposition to further empowering the
supranational institutions could become irrelevant, and the role of the national governments
would be significantly reduced. De Gaulle described this problem during a press conference on
September 9, 1965, “thus, in the terms of the text, the decisions of the Council of Ministers of
The Six would, beginning on January 1, 1966, be taken by majority vote; in other words, France
would be prepared to see her hand forced in any economic matter – therefore social and often
political [matters] – and, in particular, what would have seemed gained in the agricultural area
could be, despite her [France], placed at stake again at any moment.”218 The idea that
Community decisions could be made against the wishes of the French Government was
anathema to de Gaulle.
However, Hallstein was in favor of the move to majority voting, and saw it as further
progress towards a federal Europe. In December, 1964, he raised the issue of majority voting
during a speech in London. His comments show how far apart Hallstein and de Gaulle’s
ideological positions were. Not only did Hallstein express support for majority voting in the
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Council, but he also described the sovereignty of the countries of Europe as a “myth” because
alone none of them could play a meaningful role in world affairs. 219 Hallstein’s solution to this
problem was further supranational integration, “only by a firm union among its states can Europe
retain the sovereignty that it requires for its political task.”220 Hallstein’s speech alarmed
Gaullists because it was further evidence that the leading figures within the Community
institutions all favored further supranational integration, which France opposed. Previously, the
only way to stop these proposals was in the Council of Ministers, but with the switch to majority
voting France no longer had a veto.
The General’s Response: The Empty Chair Crisis
Throughout the spring of 1965, de Gaulle took a more direct role in crafting France’s
policy towards the Community. Previously, Couve de Murville and Agriculture Minister Edgard
Pisani crafted policies towards the EEC that were acceptable to de Gaulle, but were not
necessarily proposed by the President himself. The major exception to this was the veto of
Britain’s Community membership, which de Gaulle himself decided on against the wishes of
some in his cabinet. But in early 1965, de Gaulle changed cabinet procedure to ensure that his
ministers were carrying out his orders exactly. On April 21, 1965, Minister of Information Alain
Peyrefitte announced that “at the request of the President” procedures for ministers who
represented the French Government at various international organizations “notably the EEC”
were henceforth changed.221 This was evidence of the General’s more direct role in setting
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European policy, and the change was made to ensure de Gaulle’s ministers did not stray from his
own vision of Europe.
De Gaulle reacted strongly to both Hallstein’s proposals and the imminent shift to
majority voting in the Council. The General feared that these changes would unacceptably limit
the role of the national governments in Community decision making. As to Hallstein’s proposals,
the French Government made it clear that it only wanted to discuss the CAP funding plan, and
wanted the Council to ignore Hallstein’s other two proposals. Only the CAP funding issue
needed to be resolved by June 30, 1965.
In practice, the Commission never previously made bold proposals such as this without
first ensuring the support of France. In fact, the Commission was sometimes criticized by the
other member-states for being too closely aligned with France, to the point that leading
statesmen in Brussels sometimes compared the relationship between the Commission and the
French Government to that of the Pope and the Emperor.222 But this time, Hallstein’s proposals
certainly did not have the support of the French Government. Additionally, West Germany, the
second most powerful member of The Six, was not strongly supportive. The West German
Government agreed in principle, but wanted to negotiate some of the details. Hallstein therefore
proposed these wide-ranging reforms without first securing the firm support of either of the
largest member-states of the Community.
The Council of Ministers met from June 13 to 15, 1965, to consider the proposals. Couve
de Murville, representing France, proposed that the Council simply disregard the second two of
Hallstein’s proposals and continue funding the CAP by national contributions until 1970, when
the Treaty of Rome states the Common Market would come into full effect. The Council was
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well within its prerogatives to simply ignore Hallstein’s other two proposals, but the other five
member-states wished to discuss all three proposals, and effectively linked approval of the CAP
funding to the budgetary independence proposal and the proposal expanding the role of the
European Parliament. The Council would only approve a permanent funding plan for the CAP if
France agreed to negotiate on giving the Community its own resources and giving the European
Parliament a larger role in the budgetary process.
The General, who believed France was the only great power on the Continent, refused to
bow to this ultimatum, the likes of which he was used to giving, not receiving. The CAP was of
great importance to de Gaulle and his followers. Earlier in de Gaulle’s term, many rounds of
negotiations were necessary for The Six to formulate the CAP, and to de Gaulle it was
unacceptable that the Community seemed to be renegotiating the terms of this agreement. The
CAP’s importance is shown by a statement issued by Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte
after a cabinet meeting in October, 1964, at a time when the second round of CAP negotiations
was in progress. Peyrefitte announced, “General de Gaulle, M. Pompidou, and the government
emphasized, once more, that France would cease to participate in the European Economic
Community if the Common Market for agriculture were not organized as it had been specified
that it would be organized.”223 De Gaulle could not allow the CAP funding to be used as a
bargaining chip to force him to negotiate on proposals which he strongly opposed.
The General demanded that the final CAP funding plan be settled by June 30, the
deadline which was previously decided during the CAP negotiations in 1962. This deadline was
not met, and so early on July 1, Couve de Murville, as the rotating President of the Council,
adjourned the Council of Ministers. On July, 6, 1965, de Gaulle withdrew France’s Permanent
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Representative in Brussels. These actions started the Empty Chair Crisis, during which France
boycotted Community meetings in Brussels. The Council could not realistically continue without
France, the most politically and economically powerful member of the Community.
By the end of July, the Commission and the other member-states relented. This was in
part because of a letter Monnet wrote to Hallstein, suggesting that the Commission drop the
controversial issues and focus on the CAP funding.224 The Commission agreed to finance the
CAP, and wouldn’t press to give the Community its own resources or to expand the budgetary
role of the European Parliament. This position was expressed in a Commission memorandum
drafted by Marjolin, and to many in the French Government it was seen as satisfactory. 225 But to
the General, this was not enough.
De Gaulle saw Hallstein’s bold proposals, and the attempt by the other member-states to
force him to negotiate on the unwanted reforms, as a challenge to France’s – and therefore his
own – hegemony over the Community. This was an affront to France, which de Gaulle believed
should be the leading actor in Community affairs. The way in which Hallstein announced his
proposals to the European Parliament instead of the Council, so that the national leaders learned
of them second-hand, confirmed to de Gaulle that Hallstein sought to undermine the power of the
member-states. Finally, there was still the issue of majority voting, which de Gaulle would not
accept even though it was mandated by the Treaty of Rome. By boycotting the meetings in
Brussels, de Gaulle threatened the existence of the entire Community in order to ensure that it
conformed to his own view of European integration.
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During this time of crisis, the Commission sought to downplay the dispute and attempted
to restore unity among The Six. Professor Hallstein held a press conference the morning after the
CAP deadline passed. At this press conference he was asked whether or not the Community was
in the midst of “the most profound crisis since 1958.” He responded, “I do not like the word
crisis. We have had many difficult situations… I promised myself that I will not contribute, by
any word I pronounce, to provoking or reinforcing an atmosphere of crisis.”226 Hallstein and the
Commission recognized that they pushed too hard, and now the very future of the Community
was in danger.
In sharp contrast, De Gaulle was very bombastic in his public statements about the crisis.
He held a press conference on September 9, 1965, in which he elaborated on his rejection to
Hallstein’s proposals and the imminent change to majority voting, “now we know – heaven
knows that we know! – that there is a different concept of a European federation in which,
according to the dreams of those who conceived it, the countries would lose their national
personalities,” and would “be ruled by some technocratic, stateless, and irresponsible Aeropagus.
We know also that France is opposing this project, which contradicts all reality, with a plan for
organized co-operation among the States, evolving doubtless towards a confederation.”227 De
Gaulle paints a sharp ideological difference between his view of co-operation between sovereign
states, and the Commission’s desire for further supranational integration eventually leading to a
federation. Both Hallstein’s proposals and the move to majority voting directly challenge de
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Gaulle’s position that European integration should be built on co-operation among sovereign
states.
At this press conference, de Gaulle also brought up how bold and surprising Hallstein’s
proposals were, “the Commission, suddenly emerging from its political reserve, had formulated
on the subject of this regulation conditions intended to give itself its own budget, which would
have amounted to as much as four billion dollars, with the states handing over to it the levies and
customs receipts that would have made it literally a major independent financial power.” 228 With
financial independence such as this, the Commission could effectively appear as a real
government of the Community, whereas to de Gaulle the Commission members were nothing but
mere civil servants. Finally, de Gaulle defended his boycott of the Community by stating that it
was the combination of Hallstein’s proposals and the move to majority voting which made it
necessary. He even implied that several of the member-states colluded with the Commission in
order to isolate France, “the combination – premeditated or not – of the supranational demands
of the Brussels Commission, of the support that several delegations declared themselves ready to
give them, and finally the fact that some of our partners at the last moment went back on what
they had previously accepted, forced us to bring the negotiations [on CAP funding] to a
close.”229 To de Gaulle these issues were not merely procedural or financial, but were a sign of a
fundamental shift towards the decline of national sovereignty and the strengthening of the
supranational institutions of the Community. A month after this press conference, in October,
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1965, the other five heads of state or government wrote to de Gaulle imploring him to end the
crisis, but the General never responded.230
It was an election year in France, and the Empty Chair Crisis was an important issue in
the December, 1965, presidential elections. This was the first presidential election under the Fifth
Republic. The constitution originally stipulated that the president was to be elected by an
electoral college, but a 1962 constitutional change modified the process and instituted a direct
election. All four of de Gaulle’s electoral challengers favored ending the standoff with the
Commission. De Gaulle took the election very seriously and claimed that the issue at hand was
not just whether he was re-elected, but rather claimed that the entire future of the Republic was at
stake. In a broadcast address to the people of France, he declared, “should the massive and open
support of the citizens pledge me to remain in office, the future of the new republic will be
decidedly assured. If not, no one can doubt that it will collapse immediately, and that France will
have to suffer – but this time with no possible recourse – confusion in the state even more than
that she experienced in the past.”231 De Gaulle claimed that the French Republic, and France as a
whole, could not function without him at the helm.
Jean Monnet openly opposed de Gaulle’s re-election because the General threatened the
supranational Community system which Monnet devoted his life to building. In October, 1958,
Monnet voted in favor of de Gaulle’s new constitution; in January, 1961, he voted in favor of de
Gaulle’s referendum on Algerian independence; but in 1965, he was decidedly against de Gaulle.
Monnet went so far as to recruit people to run against the General.232 He endorsed Jean Lecanuet,
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the mayor of Rouen and member of the Christian-democratic MRP party, the party of Robert
Schuman. In the first round of the election, de Gaulle received only 44% of the vote, and
Monnet’s candidate Jean Lecanuet came in third after de Gaulle and François Mitterrand. 233 The
General did not receive the 50% of the vote necessary to be elected, and so a second round of
voting occurred. The second round was a runoff between the General and Mitterrand, with
Mitterrand’s candidacy endorsed by Monnet. But in the end, de Gaulle won the election with
55.2% of the vote.234
For de Gaulle, the election was close and it was evident that French public opinion
opposed his standoff with the Community. Even the farmers, whom de Gaulle sought to appease
by fighting fiercely for the CAP, were now upset.235 The farmers feared that de Gaulle was
jeopardizing the hard-fought benefits of the CAP by boycotting the Community and threatening
the very existence of the Common Market. Soon after the election, de Gaulle’s government
announced that Foreign Minister Couve de Murville would attend a meeting of the Council of
Ministers in Luxembourg on January 17, 1966.

The Luxembourg Compromise
Hallstein’s term as President of the Commission formally ended on January 8, 1966, and
unsurprisingly de Gaulle refused to accept his appointment to another term. This was particularly
important because the Commission would eventually oversee the unified three Communities.
However, Hallstein remained President of the Commission pro tempore, because the Rome
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Treaty stipulated he could not leave office until a replacement was chosen.236 Hallstein was
eventually replaced by Jean Rey, a Belgian, in July, 1967, a year and a half later.
The Council of Ministers met in Luxembourg from January 17 to 18, and then from
January 28 to 29, 1966. De Gaulle’s standoff with the Community ended after the adoption of the
Luxembourg Compromise by the Council. The Compromise was drafted by Paul-Henri Spaak of
Belgium, and it effectively invalided the change to majority voting in the Council of Ministers.
The Council declared that it would make decisions based on majority vote, but recognized that
“the French delegation considers that where very important interests are at stake the discussion
must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.”237 This effectively gave France, or
any other member-state, a veto over Council decisions. The other member-states recognized this
effective veto, but did not endorse it. The document states, “The six delegations note that there is
a divergence of views on what should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete
agreement.”238 Nevertheless, de Gaulle effectively retained his veto over Community decisions.
Additionally, it was decided that the Community budget overall would continue to be
funded by nation contributions until at least 1970, thereby postponing the issue of giving the
Community financial independence. It was not until the Hague Conference in 1969 that The Six
agreed to give the Community its own resources.239 Also, the proposal to expand the European
Parliament’s budgetary powers was dropped.
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De Gaulle was forced back to the negotiating table due to French public opinion, but
managed to get all the concessions he wanted. Through words and actions he reminded the
Commission that Community decisions were made by the national governments, and would be
for the foreseeable future.
Europe During de Gaulle’s Final Years
Monnet met regularly with Couve de Murville and occasionally with de Gaulle himself
during the years leading up to 1965, but after de Gaulle risked the existence of the entire
Community during the Empty Chair Crisis Monnet broke off all contact. His Action Committee
for the United States of Europe, which advocated for a federal Europe, no longer met in Paris,
but instead usually met in Bonn or Brussels. Monnet even believed that his phones in Paris were
being tapped by de Gaulle’s government.240
During the following years, de Gaulle became increasingly isolated in the Community. In
1966 he withdrew France from the integrated NATO command, and in 1967 he effectively
vetoed Britain’s second attempt to join the Community. De Gaulle was now in conflict with the
Community, with Britain, and with NATO. When in 1967 Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and
Norway once again expressed a desire to join the Community they received a very favorable
response from the Commission.241 Monnet’s Action Committee proposed a resolution in support
of Britain’s ascension to the Community for the parliaments of The Six to adopt. On October 17,
1967, the West German Bundestag unanimously approved the resolution. Monnet was in the
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visitors’ gallery and received a standing ovation after the vote. The Chancellor even came up and
sat next to him in a show of support.242 But in France, no action was taken to pass the resolution.
De Gaulle once again remained firmly opposed to Britain’s entry into the Community. At
a press conference in May, 1967, de Gaulle repeated the same reasons which he previously used
to veto Britain’s entry in 1963. He said, “Britain – who is not Continental, who remains, because
of the Commonwealth and because she is an island, committed far beyond the seas, who is tied
to the United States by all kinds of special agreements – did not merge into a Community with
set dimensions and strict rules. While this Community was taking shape, Britain therefore first
refused to participate in it and even took toward it a hostile attitude as if she saw in it a political
threat. Then she tried to join the Community. But in such conditions that the latter would have
been suffocated by this membership.”243 De Gaulle once again unilaterally set Community
policy, and his isolation among the leaders of The Six and the Commission only increased.
In 1967, new parties joined Monnet’s Action Committee. The Italian Socialists under
Pietro Nenni joined, as did all three British political parties. Significantly, the French
Independent Republicans, junior partners in de Gaulle’s coalition government, also joined the
Action Committee. The Independents were led by future president Valery Giscard d’Estaing, and
it showed that support for de Gaulle’s European policy was wavering at home. Monnet said of
these statesmen and labor leaders who were involved with his Committee during de Gaulle’s
term, “it is amazing. We lead them from defeat to defeat, and they still come to our meetings and
sign our declaration.”244 Even though Gaullism was a setback for the federalists, the dream
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continued in the minds of many leading Europeans. The Action Committee lost most of its
influence in Paris during these years, but it retained strong support in the other member-states.
De Gaulle’s era was nearing its end and his rule was challenged by the protests of May,
1968, in Paris. Although there was a backlash against these left-wing protests and de Gaulle’s
party did well in the June, 1968, elections, it was clearly the beginning of the end. The entire
political climate of France changed in the wake of these protests, and de Gaulle’s decade-long
rule was nearly finished. The General resigned on April 28, 1969.

Europe After the General
De Gaulle lived for only a year and a half after his resignation, and died on November 9,
1970. That same year Monnet turned 82, and he was no longer as active as he once was. On May
9, 1975, the 25th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, Monnet disbanded his Action
Committee. The statesmen who oversaw the first period of European integration were quickly
fading away, and it was left up to a new generation to continue unifying Europe.
Many new leaders came to power in Europe at this time, including Georges Pompidou
who replaced de Gaulle as president in 1969. Likewise, in Germany Willy Brandt became
Chancellor in 1969, and in Britain Edward Heath became Prime Minister in 1970. These new
leaders were more open to expanding both the role and membership of the Community.
In 1969, the heads of state and government of The Six met in The Hague. At this
conference the leaders made several decisions which marked the beginning of the second stage
of European integration. The Communiqué published at the end of the summit reflects a positive
outlook on both the future of European integration and the progress made up until that point. At
The Hague, the leaders of The Six finally decided to replace the system of financing the
Community through national contributions with “the integral financing of the Communities’
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budgets in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 201 of the Treaty establishing
the EEC and of strengthening the powers of the European Parliament.”245 Community revenue
would be centrally collected and be used to fund the entire Community budget, which at that
time amounted to four billion dollars.246 There would be a transitional period from 1971 through
1974 with the Community becoming financially independent in 1975. These were the issues
which brought the Community to the brink during the Empty Chair Crisis, but now all the
member-states agreed to implement what were in principle Hallstein’s proposals from 1965.
Additionally, the leaders of The Six decided to study the feasibility of a directly elected
European Parliament, although the first European Parliamentary elections did not occur until
1979.
Under Pompidou, France no longer opposed Britain’s membership in the Community. By
this time the Common Market was in full effect, with the full customs union in place since July
1, 1968. At The Hague, the heads of state and government “reaffirmed their agreement on the
principle of the enlargement of the Community, as provided by Article 237 of the Treaty of
Rome.”247 And in the case of Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway who re-applied in 1967, the
leaders “indicated their agreement to the opening of negotiations between the Community on the
one hand and the applicant states on the other. They agreed that the essential preparatory work
could be undertaken as soon as practically possible; by common consent, the preparations would
245
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take place in a most positive spirit.”248 In 1970 ascension negotiations recommenced, and on
January 1, 1973, Britain, Ireland and Denmark acceded to the Community, with Norway backing
out after a failed referendum on Community membership.
In 1970, International Research Associates, Gallup International, and American Professor
Ronald Inglehart conducted a massive opinion survey in the European nations. It was conducted
a year after de Gaulle resigned, and shows that in 1970 the General’s views were not
representative of French opinion as a whole. When asked about the “evolution of the Common
Market towards the political formation of the United States of Europe,” 63% in France supported
this, and only 13% were opposed.249 When asked about the “formation of a European
government,” 53% were in favor, and only 28% were opposed.250 As to their “general attitude
towards the Unification of Europe,” 70% of those in France responded “very favorable” or
“somewhat favorable” and only 8% responded with “unfavorable” or “very unfavorable.”251
Finally, when asked their “attitude towards the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market”
60% in France supported it, and only 15% were opposed.252 Clearly the French public in 1970
did not support either de Gaulle’s European policy or his opposition to the supranational
Communities. In fact, French public opinion aligned with the federalists, who de Gaulle
constantly ridiculed during his years as president. Gaullism no longer held sway over France’s
policy on European integration, and with public support for Britain’s membership in the
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Community and for further supranational integration, France would no longer obstruct progress
towards a united Europe.
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CONCLUSION

France, influenced by Jean Monnet and other federalist statesmen, was the driving force
behind the creation of the supranational European Communities during the 1950s. The French
Government’s support for supranational integration and the Communities was strong, although
not all national political groups were in agreement – notably the Gaullists, who worked to defeat
the Defense Community and opposed delegating French sovereignty to the Communities.
When General de Gaulle came to power in June, 1958, this Gaullist rejection of
supranational integration became the official policy of the French Government, thus ending the
first period of supranational European integration. Under the leadership of the General, France
prevented any further supranational integration and worked to reduce the power of the
supranational institutions already in existence. This opposition to further integration lasted until
de Gaulle resigned in April, 1969. After the departure of the General, once again the memberstates of the Community recommenced working towards further supranational integration, and
also the enlargement of the Community.
The legacy of both Monnet’s and de Gaulle’s approaches to European integration
continue to be seen in the current European Union. Europe has achieved deeper supranational
integration in all policy areas since the reign of the General, and continues to progress towards
the ultimate goal of a European federation, as Monnet desired. However, all major decisions on
further empowering the Union continue to be made by the national governments, and these
decisions are made via treaties between the sovereign member-states of the Union, as de Gaulle
102

foresaw. So although European nations continue to delegate sovereignty to supranational
institutions with the ultimate hope of creating a federation as Monnet desired, de Gaulle’s view
of integration as co-operation between sovereign states continues to be the practical formula of
Community decision making.
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